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ABSTRACT 
Empirical legal scholars have traditionally modeled trial court 
judicial opinion writing by assuming that judges act rationally, 
seeking to maximize their influence by writing opinions in 
politically important cases. To test such views, we collected data 
from a thousand cases in four different jurisdictions. We recorded 
information about every judicial action over each case’s life, 
ranging from the demographic characteristics, workload, and 
experience of the writing judge; to information about the case, 
including its jurisdictional basis, complexity, attorney 
characteristics, and motivating legal theory; to information about 
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the individual orders themselves, including the relevant procedural 
posture and the winning party. 
Our data reveal opinions to be rare events in the litigation 
process: only 3% of all orders, and only 17% of orders applying 
facts to law, are fully reasoned. Using a hierarchical linear model, 
we conclude that judges do not write opinions to curry favor with 
the public or with powerful audiences, nor do they write more when 
they are less experienced, seeking to advance their careers, or in 
more interesting case types. Instead, opinion writing is significantly 
affected by procedure: we predict that judges are three times more 
likely to write an opinion on a summary judgment motion than a 
discovery motion, all else held equal. Judges similarly write more in 
cases that are later appealed, and in commercial cases, while 
writing less in tort and prisoner cases. Finally, jurisdictional 
culture is very important. These findings challenge the conventional 
wisdom and suggest the need for further research on the behavioral 
aspects of opinion writing. 
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For many observers of the American legal system, law is what judges 
write in appellate opinions.1 These observers are mistaken.2 But the 
gravitational pull of an appellate-centered view of the legal world is 
strong. Opinions from such tribunals continue to dominate the training of 
new lawyers and are widely disseminated by the mainstream media. 
Legal realists have challenged the hegemony of appellate courts and 
urge us to focus on the trial courts as paradigmatic policymakers.3 But 
 
 
 1. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 
518 (2006) (describing “conventional” view that the “language of judicial opinions represents the 
law”). Llewellyn described how this view is inculcated in law students: “What do you see? You see 
the so-called ‘case’, as reported from the court of review. Its name or ‘style’, the court that decided it 
. . . . Almost you can say, the opinion for the purposes of case-books is ‘the case’.” K. N. LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 37 (1969); see also NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING 
OURSELVES TO DEATH 20 (1985) (“The law is what legislators and judges have written.”). 
 2.  
For a thousand [cases] which reach the intermediate court there are ten or twenty thousand 
which go wholly unappealed . . . . Here in this moving mountain of the cases unappealed, is 
the impact of the officials on society—even within the realm of litigation . . . . By my own 
showing, on my own premises, these are what count. I pass them by. Out of my own mouth, 
damned. 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 90. 
 3. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A 
SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 215–20 (1997) (summarizing studies on district courts). 
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how should studies of the trial courts proceed? Treatise writers commonly 
deploy a motley selection of district court opinions to describe doctrine.4 
Realizing that such unsystematic choices may mislead, a new cohort of 
empiricists—sometimes called the “new legal realists”—have instead 
amassed and evaluated large datasets of district court opinions, writing 
dozens of papers evaluating judicial rhetoric in the aggregate.5  
This Article argues that the new realists have made two wrong turns. 
The first is structural: they err in using as their unit of analysis the case as 
a whole, when the appropriate way to evaluate litigation is the individual 
judicial order. The second is motivational: they err in assuming that trial 
judges’ opinion-writing practices are rational and utility-maximizing. 
Scholars are thus misled to conclude that opinions from the district courts 
are good proxies for how judges resolve disputes, and even can be 
authoritative proof of what the “law” is.  
We remedy such errors by applying a novel statistical methodology to 
a dataset we created that consists of thousands of individual trial court 
orders. Our analysis rebuts the conventional account of opinion writing. 
We suggest an alternative story, which is not ruled out by the data, and 
hypothesize that trial court opinion writing is motivated by the fear of 
reversal. Such structural and motivational challenges to the status quo 
unsettle a great number of recent law reform proposals based on empirical 
analyses of opinions’ content.  
But this paper is only partly about why trial judges write opinions. We 
seek to advance a developing methodological approach to legal realism 
and the study of law.6 That method is docketology: the intensive study of 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., 6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 12.15(1)(B), at 
513 (5th ed. 2005) (citing 11 district court cases); 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: 
A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 9.2.2, at 1186 (2002) (citing 10 district court 
cases); 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 10-3, at 723 (4th ed. 2004) 
(citing 19 district court cases); 1 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12.18, at 551 (4th 
ed. 2005) (citing 15 district court cases); 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 105, at 360 (3d ed. 1998) (citing 9 district court cases). 
 5. See infra note 9. The term comes from a new ABA project. See The New Legal Realism 
Project, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). At an important recent 
conference, presenters from a wide variety of fields demonstrated the high ambitions of the project. 
See The First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Texas, Austin, 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/cels2006/index.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). 
 6. Early work in this tradition was led by Theodore Eisenberg. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 
1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (examining 
docket records in California); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional 
Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL. L. REV. 641 (1987) (same). Recent work continues this focus on specific 
doctrinal areas and largely looks at outcomes from dockets. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. 
Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement 
of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006) (using Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
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trial court dockets. As we show, a great deal of substantive legal work 
occurs in trial court decisions that are not fully explained. This under-
explained work, as we will describe, makes up the constitutive backbone 
of litigants’ substantive rights and immunities, but, because it is not easily 
available, it has been essentially ignored. Why? As noted realist Karl 
Llewellyn explained: 
I am a prey, as is every may who tries to work with law, to the 
apperceptive mass. . . . What records have I of the work of [trial 
court] magistrates? How shall I get them? Are they any? And if 
there are, must I search them out myself? But the appellate courts 
make access to their work convenient. They issue reports, printed, 
bound, to be had all gathered for me in libraries. The convenient 
source of information lures.7 
Such laments are obsolete. Federal trial dockets have been digitized 
since 2003. By looking at each individual order in the cases’ e-dockets, we 
can illuminate what the law’s rights and duties actually mean in practice. 
A legal right, after all, is given meaning by how the litigation to enforce it 
unfolds. We conclude that drafters of Restatements, treatises, and other 
qualitative descriptions of the common law remain too wedded to opinions 
and ignore the ways in which the dozens of judicial choices in each case—
ranging from motions to compel, to partial grants of motions to dismiss, to 
motions in limine—together create important, unseen limits and glosses on 
doctrine.8 At its most ambitious, this Article develops a research agenda 
that would reorient modern scholarship toward a neglected source of 
 
 
data supplemented by docket reports); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005) (applying district-court outcome statistics to 
the federal sentencing guidelines); Anne Morrison Piehl & Margo Schlanger, Determinants of Civil 
Rights Filings in Federal District Court by Jail and Prison Inmates, 1 TJ. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.T 79 
(2004); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (using a mix of 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts data, docket filings, and qualitative data to examine 
inmate litigation)T; Jean O. Lanjouw & TJosh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary 
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (analyzing patent cases).  
 The recently-launched Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse focuses in part on collecting 
information about trial court dockets. See Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 
HThttp://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/TH; Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for 
Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 TUMKC L. REV. T 
153 (2006) (explaining project).  
 7. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at  90. He continued: “Men work with it, first, because it is there; 
and because they have worked with it, men build it into ideology.” 
 8. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
WISC. L. REV. 631, 674 (discussing relationship between appellate review and the “managerial” model 
of litigation). 
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information about law. Our work on opinions is but the first fruits of that 
project. 
By way of further introduction, we begin with a definition. The number 
of new realists’ articles using district court opinions is quite large.9 For 
simplicity, we will refer to scholars who count opinions as a way of 
learning about legal authority as “opinionologists.” Opinionologists 
typically proceed by gathering a sample of opinions collected from the 
Westlaw or Lexis databases. They then engage in content analysis10: 
coding opinions for selected variables, they attempt to explain changes in 
legal rules using statistical regressions.11  
Most opinionologists are careful to recognize that opinions might be 
unrepresentative of how trial courts resolve legal problems:  
• T“Because this review is limited to those decisions reported on 
WESTLAW, it is not exhaustive in its scope; rather it merely 
touches on the ‘tip of the iceberg.’”12 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007) (collecting opinions, including 217 from the district courts, 
and performing content analysis); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PENN L. REV. (analyzing dataset of district and circuit court patent 
cases) (forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=99841); Mitu Gulati et al., TFraud by 
Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004) (examining securities doctrine); Robert A. Hillman, 
TTQuestioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, TT98 
COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998) (examining federal and state promissory estoppel opinions); Sean M. 
McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court 
Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (analyzing dataset of five years of district court 
opinions); Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District 
Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1628–29 n.36 (2003) (analyzing school desegregation opinionsTT); 
TTGregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence 
from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV 1021 (2005) (analyzing religious liberty cases); 
Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of 
Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 491 (2004) (same); Brian A. Sutherland, Whether 
Consent to Search was Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors that Predict the 
Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192 (2006) (analyzing consent 
requirement); TAdam Winkler, TFatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, TT59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (TT2006)T (Tanalyzing strict scrutiny opinions from 
1990 and 2003).T 
 10. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, Wake 
Forest University Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 913336, July 2006, at 3, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=913336 (“[Content analysis] could form the basis for an empirical 
methodology that is uniquely legal.”).  
 11. Quantitative research generally is an increasingly important form of legal scholarship in elite 
law journals. See infra Appendix A-3 (discussing growth of quantitative scholarship); see also Hall & 
Wright, supra note 10, at 6–8 (discussing growth of case counting in law reviews). 
 12. Gregory A. Gordillo, Summary Judgment and Problems in Applying the Celotex Trilogy 
Standard, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 263, 278 n.106 (1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
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• “By examining only published decisions, we biased our database 
in favor of decisions that raise highly visible, controversial, 
landmark, or difficult questions . . . or at least issues . . . that a 
judicial actor found particularly interesting and thus worthy of 
publication.”13 
• “For discussions of some of the vices inherent in analyzing legal 
issues by looking at reported cases, see generally [long string 
citation].”14 
• “Although we acknowledge that published opinions, both district 
and appellate, may not be representative of all underlying case 
findings, this does not mean that one must abandon hope of 
obtaining useful insights about an area of law from them.”15 
But with exceptions,16 opinionologists proceed to claim that the dataset 
of opinions is good enough for statistical inference.17 After all, scholars 
 
 
 13. Sisk, Traditional and Minority Religions, supra note 9, at 1049.  
The collected set of published opinions also is likely to be skewed toward those cases that 
raised viable, as opposed to frivolous, claims and those that resulted in decisions in favor of 
claimants against the government, because judicial rulings that overturn the decisions of 
governmental entities are more likely to generate the kind of attention and interest by judges 
that would lead those judges to submit such decisions for publication. 
Id. 
 14. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 N.W. L. REV. 943, 944 n.4 
(1992). 
 15. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal 
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991). See also TPat K. Chew, Unwrapping Racial 
Harassment Law, TT27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49,T 52 n.7 (2006) (“Basing an empirical study on 
published opinions also has certain limitations.”); Gulati et al., supra note 9 T, Tat T803 (“[The] data suffer 
from an incompleteness problem arising from reliance on published opinions.”); TJeff L. Lewin, The 
Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty,” T57 MD. L. REV. 
380, 435 (1998) (“[E]mpirical shortcomings that result from using published opinions as evidence of 
litigation practice are obvious.”); TMcEldowney, supra note 9, at 10 Tn.51 (“For the purposes of this 
Note, I use the term ‘published’ to refer to any opinion available on Westlaw, whether or not the 
opinion is reported in an official reporter.”);T TPeter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the 
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 
24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1135 (1990) (“We begin in section II by confirming what most readers 
probably know already—the potential unrepresentativeness of cases with published opinions is likely 
to be significant because only a few cases ever leave a published record.”); TSutherland, supra note 9, at 
2205 (“[H]ard cases are more likely to appear in the sample [of opinions] than easy cases . . . .”); 
TWinkler, Tsupra note 9, at 811 n.T104T (T“Some applications of strict scrutiny necessarily evaded the data 
set by the decision to focus only on published opinions.”).T 
 16. Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 889, 903 (2006) (explaining limited use her article would make of unqualified claims of 
statistical inference based on reported opinions). 
 17. As Hall and Wright observe, “[a]ll empirical studies are imperfect . . . . The goal in selecting 
cases in not a perfect match between sample frame and research conclusions, but only a reasonable 
connection between the two . . . .” Hall & Wright, supra note 10, at 32. 
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should focus on “difficult” cases, not “easy” ones.18 And “agonized 
handwringing” about sampling bias can quickly tire even the enterprising 
empiricist.19  
Consider the metaphor describing law as an iceberg.20 To date, 
opinionologists have treated the tip of the iceberg (opinions available 
online or in print reporters) as fundamentally identical to the part hidden 
below the waterline (orders that are merely commands to the parties). On 
this view, sampling from the online databases provides a decent sense of 
the law’s shape. Of course, most opinionologists acknowledge that there is 
a bias in this dataset. They have identified two basic factors that may 
increase the likelihood of opinion writing for a given case: 
• Importance of Case: cases that are perceived to be politically 
significant or novel; 
• Judicial Demographics: cases under the control of judges who 
are young and wish to be promoted, or who possess different 
racial or gender characteristics than the majority.  
Opinionologists’ assumptions about these variables have been largely 
confirmed by a large number of statistically motivated articles by political 
scientists.21 Such data have (perversely) comforted opinionologists by 
suggesting that opinions are like orders, only more interesting. Bolstered 
by such evidence, the empirical movement rolls onward. 
As we earlier alluded, this paper challenges the opinionologist 
orthodoxy’s structural and motivational approaches to studying trial 
courts.  
First, we develop a distinct structural approach to studying trial court 
litigation. We have collected data on approximately 1,000 cases from four 
different trial court jurisdictions. For each case, we have coded 
information on every judicial action (we call such actions “dispositions”) 
taken during the case’s lifecycle. We coded up to forty-four pieces of 
 
 
 18. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, T90 VA. L. REV. 301 T, T313 (2004) (“Our sample 
is limited to published opinions. This limitation obviously simplifies research, but it also follows from 
our basic goal, which is to test the role of ideology in difficult cases rather than easy ones.”). T 
 19. Hall & Wright, supra note 10, at 31. 
 20. See, e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1152 (studying factors influencing 
publication in LEXIS). An early work in this tradition, using a slightly different metaphor, is Marc S. 
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) 
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) (pyramid 
metaphor discussed). 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 52–93. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
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information for each judicial action, including the wealth and numbers of 
lawyers involved, the experience (as of the date of the order) of the judge, 
the procedure, the numbers of parties, and who won that particular order. 
We thus created an unprecedented dataset describing federal district court 
activity. 
Second, unlike opinionologists, we do not start from the assumption 
that judges’ opinion-writing practices are rational. Instead, we assume that 
judges are cognitively biased decision makers.22 A particularly important 
bias affecting judicial behavior is risk aversion. We hypothesize that 
judges sometimes overreact to what is in fact a rare risk of reversal by 
appellate courts, leading them to structure their case management in 
unexpected ways.  
Within each case, judges make many decisions theoretically subject to 
appellate review. But few such decisions are actually reviewed: most cases 
are not appealed, and most decisions within cases that are appealed are 
ignored by the appellate panel because they are not the specific order 
under review. If judges believe that individual decisions within cases 
accompanied by opinions are less likely to be reversed than those without 
such reasoning, judges may write opinions—instead of mere orders—for 
decisions they believe will be reviewed by a higher court.  
Several factors might lead judges to believe that a decision within a 
case will be appealed. Some may relate to the type of case itself: 
groundbreaking decisions concerning individual liberties, for example, 
may be perceived as heading toward the Supreme Court. But we posit that 
such case factors are likely to be insignificant compared with the effect of 
procedure. The rules of procedure largely determine whether a decision 
within a case can be appealed at all, and they push specific categories of 
order toward appellate review. For example, discovery orders are rarely 
reviewed by appellate courts because parties generally cannot appeal them 
until the end of the case. Summary judgment decisions, by contrast, are 
dispositive if granted. Judges know this, and might choose to write more 
opinions at summary judgment than in discovery. That choice is 
independent of the “hardness” or legal novelty of the underlying matters 
decided. Thus, in an important sense, the rules of civil procedure will often 
 
 
 22. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (providing evidence 
of intuitive judging and proposing an “intuitive-override” theory of judicial behavior). 
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determine what we can learn about trial court litigation from studying trial 
court opinions.23 
This Article has four Parts. In Part I, we set out the opinionologist 
orthodoxy, drawing on judicial biographies and autobiographies and 
articles from political scientists and law professors. We then suggest an 
alternative, behavioral model of opinion writing. We develop a reversal 
hypothesis, that opinion writing will increase with the likelihood of appeal, 
and a settlement hypothesis, that opinion writing is a tool that judges use to 
manage parties’ cognitive biases and increase the odds of settlement. 
In Part II, we discuss our methodology and provide a description of the 
data that we collected.  
In Part III, we evaluate the data, using a statistical technique called 
hierarchical linear modeling that here makes its first sustained appearance 
in the legal literature and that enables us to deal with characteristics of 
common law decision making that previous authors have all but ignored.24 
The data do not support the orthodoxy’s view of opinion writing: we 
found no evidence that case importance or judicial demographic 
characteristics affect judicial writing practices. Neither did we find any 
clear evidence supporting our settlement hypothesis. Our reversal 
hypothesis was not excluded by the data, but more work is needed to 
determine whether it offers a complete explanation of judicial motivation.  
In Part IV, we expand on docketology’s contribution to the empirical 
study of law, offering a critique of a specific published paper which used 
statistical analysis to shed light on a facet of federal securities law 
doctrine.25 We finally offer some thoughts on the larger promise, and 
perils, of the research project that we propose. 
I. MODELING OPINION WRITING 
This Part describes and critiques the opinionologist orthodoxy. As 
noted in the introduction, the conventional wisdom makes critical 
structural and motivational assumptions. Structurally, the orthodoxy 
ignores the iterated nature of trial court work and assumes that within a 
case, a judge has one opportunity to write (or not write) an opinion, 
instead of many. Motivationally, the orthodoxy relies on a traditional 
 
 
 23. Cf. C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS 122–23 (1996) (observing that pre-trial rulings are “rarely published” and that they are 
“largely immune from appellate court contradiction”). 
 24. For an extended treatment of the technique, see infra Appendix B. 
 25. See David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 
608 (2006). 
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economic view of human behavior—the rational actor model—and 
assumes that courts seek to maximize their utility in the most efficient way 
possible. These assumptions are problematic. 
We begin this Part by describing the relevant differences between 
opinions and orders in the district courts, and we discuss how the former 
end up on computer screens through Westlaw and Lexis. In Section B, we 
explain the orthodoxy’s theoretical assumptions. In Section C, we 
summarize its empirical findings. Finally, in Section D, using insights 
from behavioral law and economics and motivated by docketology’s 
structural approach, we suggest alternative testable hypotheses about why 
judges write opinions. 
A. Defining Opinion Writing 
When a trial judge makes a decision within a litigation, how is it 
disseminated? The judge might hang a flag outside the window: “blue” for 
a plaintiff’s victory, “red” for defendants, and “green” for indeterminate. 
Or the court might instead perform an interpretative dance, stomping to 
the right or left as the law compels. But why sweat? Why not simply smile 
knowingly at the winning party?  
These possibilities are whimsy. Trial courts issue orders. Each trial 
court decision has, as its last line, the judge’s signature, compelling the 
parties to the case to take whatever action that she deems necessary.26  
Some orders contain more text before that signature than others, 
explaining the court’s reasoning. As the citations and rhetoric garnishing 
such a text increase in number and effect, it starts to look like an opinion 
of the sort that first-year law students are accustomed to reading in their 
case books.27 Ultimately, what divides such opinions from orders is a 
matter of degree and the choice of a judge, or a publishing company, to 
make that text publicly available. Today, the decision to designate certain 
dispositions as opinions is largely in the hands of judges. How that came 
to be requires a very brief historical detour.28 
 
 
 26. There are very limited circumstances where non-parties to an action may be compelled by a 
trial court’s order. See, e.g., Haymond v. Lundy, No. 99-5048, 2002 WL 1964336, at *6–10 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 23, 2002) (describing rules on binding non-parties to action). Federal Marshalls and clerks may 
also be compelled by judicial orders, presumably as a facet of the court’s inherent authority over its 
employees.  
 27. Technically, some judges issue opinions as separate documents from orders; others append 
the “order” as the last page of the opinion. In our coding, we coded as one document any opinion and 
order combination. 
 28. For a slightly different version of this story, see Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: 
Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at SSRN 
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In the past, federal district court judges only “published” a small 
number of their decisions.29 Publication meant that the judge’s words were 
reprinted in a paper copy of the Federal Supplement or the Federal Rules 
Decisions, reporters owned by the West Company.30 Before the 
widespread use of electronic research databases, unpublished decisions 
were unread.31 However, the decision to publish (or not) was not scientific: 
the West Company generally put opinions into Reporters at judges’ 
requests.32 Thus, “publication” used to be practically quite significant.33 
Westlaw and Lexis (together, “the databases”) changed this picture 
somewhat by digitizing all judicial opinions, reported or not.34 But the 
choice of what to explain in an opinion was unguided: although courts 
were directed to only write opinions on issues of “continuing public 
interest,” they had extensive discretion.35 Finally, the system the databases 
 
 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006101, at 12–14. 
 29. Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, T25 JUST. SYS. 
121T, 122 (2004) (“Federal district court judges release fewer than 20 percent of their written opinions 
for publication . . . .”).  
 30. See T ony Mauro, TTUnpublished Opinions: Inedible Sausage or Crazy Uncle?,TT LAW.COM, Apr. 
12, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1081348862446; see also TROBERT A. CARP AND C.K. 
ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 16 (1983) (“When the 
average practitioner considers the actions taken by the federal district courts he thinks of the West 
publications—first the Federal Supplement, and then on a moment’s reflection he will probably recall 
the Federal Rules of Decision.”) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); Amy E. Sloan, A 
Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural 
Rule, T79 IND. L.J. 711, 720 (2004) (noting that non-published opinions were not available in print 
reporters); Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 6, at 162.T 
 31. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 23, at 18–19. 
 32. Id. at 19. 
 33. But not legally relevant. Trial court decisions have marginal precedential effect, as they do 
not bind other Article III courts or state courts.  
 34. A West Reference Attorney explained that “[t]he difficulty with discussing unpublished 
opinions is that there is not a very clear definition of what opinions are considered unpublished. The 
definition used to mean decisions that did not appear in a print reporter . . . [T]oday we (and 
competitors) carry many decisions that will never appear in a print reporter.” E-mail from Thomson 
West Reference Attorney to Marcie Seiler, Research Assistant to Professor Hoffman (Nov. 21, 2006, 
19:52 EST) (on file with authors).  
 35. In 1964, the Federal Judicial Center began to discourage federal courts from spending time 
on “unpublished” decisions. See Swenson, supra note 29, at 121. Less than ten years after the Center 
revealed its policy, the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice issued formal guidelines to govern 
opinion writing. The guidelines suggested that an opinion should be published if it established a new 
rule of law or modified an existing rule, if it involved a legal issue of “continuing public interest,” if it 
criticized existing law, or if it resolved a conflict of authority. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the 
Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 941 n.3 (1989). It is interesting to compare these events with the 
contemporaneous move to codify federal statutes and regulations. Cf. Note, Federal Register and the 
Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80 HARV. L. REV. 439 (1966) (discussing the history of 
the codification project as a product of the desire for uniformity).  
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used to disseminate any written materials to customers was eclectic.36 
The E-Government Act of 2002 changed this distribution system by 
requiring federal courts to post all of their “opinions” on their websites, 
regardless of whether the opinions were designated (for the Federal 
Supplement) as published or unpublished.37 The Judicial Conference 
defines “written opinion” as “any document issued by a judge or judges of 
the court, sitting in that capacity, that sets forth a reasoned explanation for 
a court’s decision.”38 The definition excludes routine dispositions like 
scheduling orders or rulings on motions for extension of time.39 The 
databases harvest such opinions and, after adding codes like Keycites, 
make them available for a fee.  
Thus in theory if a disposition is on Westlaw or Lexis, a judge has 
determined that it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for a court’s 
decision.” If that modern disposition is not on Westlaw or Lexis, the judge 
has decided not to explain it fully. Texts that judges do not designate as 
opinions will remain unseen, except by those individuals who are willing 
to pay to access the docket, or come to the courthouse in person. 
We are thus comfortable distinguishing between opinions and orders 
with a simple definition: 
For our purposes, an “opinion” is any judicial disposition on 
Westlaw or Lexis; an “order” is any disposition that is not.  
We seek to determine when trial courts resolve dispositions through 
what they perceive to be “routine, non-substantive orders” and when they 
(instead) “set forth a reasoned explanation” for their decisions. We will 
identify reasoned dispositions by their presence in the electronic 
databases.40 
 
 
 36. TBeginning in 1973, Lexis offered access to opinions in its electronic databases, and in 1975 
Westlaw did the same.T See TLawrence Duncan MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the 
Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law, 
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 621 (2000). TUntil very recently, the Databases obtained opinions when 
the court, judges, clerks, and attorneys submitted them. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 23, at 18 
(“[The] attitude of West publishing company . . . seems to be that it will publish any writing which a 
sitting federal district judge sends into the company.” (quoting Allen Vestal, Reported Opinions, infra 
note 52, at 405)). 
 37. LINDA D. KOONTZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: 
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE MADE PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002, 
(2004) available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-12.  
 38. See Release Notes, District CM/ECF, Version 2.4, HThttps://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/info/ 
releases/2.4.htmTH (last visited Jan. 28, 2008); HTPub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), TTH116 Stat. 2899, 2913 
(codified at HTT44 U.S.C. § 3501 TTH). T 
 39. Id.  
 40. We recognize that there are differences in opinion-writing practice between jurisdictions, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
694 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:681 
 
 
 
 
B. The Theory of Opinionology 
The orthodoxy assumes that judges are rational and write opinions to 
maximize their expected utility. Two recent contributions, by Seventh 
Circuit Judge Richard Posner and by Ahmed Taha, are paradigmatic.41 
Taha’s model, unlike Posner’s, accounts for the desire to achieve 
promotion among trial courts and attempts to measure the independent 
utility of writing.42  
The basic import of such models is that judges will be more likely to 
write an opinion in cases where they can best advance their policy 
preferences. Such disputes are the high-profile, constitutional, and federal 
civil rights matters that dominate news coverage. Similarly, judges will 
write opinions more in federal question cases and when writing to 
powerful audiences of lawyers and parties. We have referred to this as the 
importance bias or hypothesis. Similarly, judges who are younger or who 
are themselves women or minorities may choose to write as a way of 
increasing the likelihood of public exposure and recognition and thus 
promotion.43 We referred to this as the demographic bias or hypothesis.  
C. Opinionology: The Empirical Evidence 
1. The Story Judges Tell Themselves 
District judges rarely discuss their role as opinion writers. Those that 
do ascribe to themselves a dispute management, rather than law-shaping, 
 
 
this description is the product of one of the authors’ experiences firsthand as a district court clerk in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and then as a litigator in several other jurisdictions. Indeed, our 
category system oversimplifies. We observed some “orders” that cited case law and ran for multiple 
pages and some “opinions” that were merely a few paragraphs long.  
 41. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (analyzing behavior of appellate judges); Ahmed E. Taha, 
Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2004) 
(analyzing, in part, district judges). 
 42. Taha, supra note 41, at 5. Taha’s model reads: TUBiB(t Bp B, t Bj B, t BlB, P(t Bp B), C(t Bp B, t Bj B), R(t Bp B, t Bj B), I(t BlB), O). In 
the model, Ti represents a judge; Tt Bp TB is the time spent writing; Tt BjTB all other judicial activities, including 
writing orders; tTBlTB is leisure time; P is the utility associated with writing; C is the probability associated 
with promotion to a more prestigious court (itself a function of a tradeoff between opinion writing and 
other judicial functions); R measures reputation; I represents income; and O is other utility, including 
the possibility of reversal. Posner’s “very simple formal model of the judicial utility function” 
excludes the possibility of utility from writing or promotion. It reads: U = U(t BjB, t BlB, I, R, O). Posner, 
supra note 41, at 31. 
 43. See JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND 
PERFORMANCE 238–39 (1985) (discussing demographic effects). 
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function.44 If opinions are necessary at all, most judges explain them as 
persuasive writings directed at higher courts.45 As Judge Kinneary of the 
Southern District of Ohio opined, “I think the fundamental reason to write 
an opinion is to state the reasons for arriving at a certain conclusion, which 
primarily benefits the court of appeals.”46 And a California bankruptcy 
judge glossed: “I think it is particularly important for a bankruptcy judge 
to explain rulings because the appellate courts are [not] bankruptcy 
specialists. I have learned the hard way that it is a decision not fully 
explained that returns to haunt.”47 
Appellate judges have grander ambitions.48 Former D.C. Circuit Judge 
Patricia Wald explained that judges must write to “reinforce [the 
judiciary’s] oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others—
including our duly elected political leaders—what to do.”49 She continued 
that opinions demonstrate the consistent application of the rule of law, 
permit judicial expression, enhance policymaking and persuasion, enable 
personal gratification of recognition through citation, assist courts to 
obtain better law clerks, and maximize the odds of promotion.50 Wald, 
 
 
 44. As one trial court judge wrote, in praising another: 
THe had his share of important cases, but he knew that the primary role of a trial judge is not to 
chart new directions in the law or to write learned legal treatises of opinions. Rather, it is to 
ascertain the facts and the law in individual cases and to deal fairly, justly and courteously 
with the litigants and lawyers who find themselves before him or her. T 
The THonorable Dickinson R. DebevoiseT, Tribute to the Honorable John F. Gerry, 6 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 7, 9 (1995). 
 45. By contrast, a survey in the mid-1970s reported that some jurisdictions’ judges believed that 
“opinion preparation [was] an essential part of their jobs. . . . [T]rial judges are uniquely equipped to 
contribute to the development of law in many areas . . . .” STEVEN FLANDERS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 58 (1977). 
 46. Robert S. Alexander, Standing on the Corner When the Streetcar Came By: An Interview 
With the Honorable Joseph P. Kinneary (1905–2003), 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 451, 471 (2003). 
 47. George W. Kuney, Where We Are and Where We Think We Are: An Empirical Examination 
of Bankruptcy Precedent, 28 CAL. BANKR. J. 71, 90 (2005). 
 48. Although some admit that opinion writing serves to minimize the chances of reversal. See 
TKaren M. Poole, Whitbeck: Case Time, E-Filing Are Priorities as COA Chief, MICH. L. WKLY., Dec. 
10, 2001, at 121, available at http://www.milawyersweekly.com/subscriber/archives_FTS.cfm? 
page=mi/01/C10014.htm&recID=65508*QueryText=whitbeck%20und%20poole (reporting on 
Appellate Judge comments): 
TSecond, to a greater or lesser degree judges at the TTtrial courtTT level are looking over their 
shoulders at the Court of Appeals, while judges in the Court of Appeals are looking over their 
shoulders at the Supreme Court. Some profess not to care. I care. I’ll be very candid about 
that. So if the Supreme Court is going to reverse me, at least they are going to know my 
reasons for deciding as I did. They may find my reasons to be wrong, but at least they’re 
going to know what they are. I’m just not going to jump to some conclusion. This is my style. 
Other judges have totally different styles.T 
 49. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995). 
 50. Id. at 1372. 
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however, confined these ambitions to the appellate courts: the “[a]bsence 
of rhetoric [in unpublished dispositions] is principally an appellate court 
problem,” because “[t]he higher a court’s place in the judicial hierarchy, 
the more important it is for that court to rationalize its results.”51  
2. Previous Empirical Scholarship 
The opinionologists’ quantitative case starts with Professor Allan 
Vestal’s work on publication practice in the district courts.52 Vestal’s 
scholarship, completed on the eve of the electronic database revolution,53 
observed that the “production of helpful writings by district court judges is 
almost completely a matter of discretion”;54 whether to write an opinion 
(or not) was “essentially a personal matter decided by each federal 
judge.”55 He argued that judges’ preferences to advance policy goals 
informed this discretion, as did West Publishing’s collection practices.56  
In one work, Vestal analyzed 3,012 opinions from 1962. He found that 
some states had more published opinions than others,57 and that doctrinal 
categories were unevenly distributed in the database.58 Vestal also found 
that different jurisdictions produced different numbers of opinions per 
judge, from one in Washington State to twenty-three in the District of 
Maryland.59  
Later work, following in Vestal’s tradition, generally tried to account 
for the differences between the sample of cases represented by reported 
opinions and the universe of cases at large.60 Such data suggested that 
 
 
 51. Id. at 1375.  
 52. See Allan D. Vestal, Reported Opinions of the Federal District Courts: Analysis and 
Suggestions, 52 IOWA L. REV. 379 (1966); Allan D. Vestal, Reported Federal District Court Opinions: 
Fiscal 1962, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 185 (1966); Allan D. Vestal, A Survey of Federal District Court 
Opinions: West Publishing Company Reports, 20 SW. L.J. 63 (1966); Allan D. Vestal, Publishing 
District Court Opinions in the 1970s, 17 LOY. L. REV. 673 (1970). 
 53. See Vestal, Reported Opinions, supra note 52, at 380 (“There has now appeared on the 
horizon of legal research a cloud no larger than the hand of a man which foreshadows changes in 
reporting and distribution more significant than those of the past one hundred years. This is the use of 
computers.”). 
 54. See id. at 387. Vestal noted that the lack of an opinion could result in appellate disfavor. Id. 
at 387 n.37. 
 55. See Vestal, Survey, supra note 52, at 96. 
 56. See Vestal, Reported Opinions, supra note 52, at 390–91. 
 57. Primarily, opinions arising from eastern courts. 
 58. See Vestal, Reported Opinions 1962, supra note 52, at 190–215. 
 59. See Vestal, Survey, supra note 52, at 82 tbl.VI. 
 60. This focus may confuse modern readers, because, as we have observed, there is no difference 
today between opinions published and unpublished: both can be found on the databases. But these 
previous authors were writing in a time when the lines had not yet blurred. 
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approximately only five61 to twenty62 percent of cases result in a reported 
opinion.63 The opinionologist orthodoxy has assumed that the unpublished 
“missing cases” represent a rational choice by judges seeking to maximize 
political, legal, or personal ends.64 As Siegelman and Donohue explained: 
The most important pattern that emerges from [the analysis] is a 
simple one: cases with published opinions are indeed significantly 
different from those without them. The published cases tend to be 
longer, more complicated, more heavily concentrated on newer 
areas of the law. They also seem to include a different mix of 
plaintiff occupations, to proceed at a different pace through the legal 
system, and to end in different kinds of outcomes.65 
Similarly, Susan Olson concluded that the “choice of which and how 
many judicial opinions to send up [to the reporter system] is left up to the 
individual district judges with only minimal policy guidance.”66 
Thus, the opinionologist orthodoxy concluded that there is a problem 
of unrepresentativeness in the database of federal district court opinions, 
which was worth more detailed study.67 In recent years, scholars have 
 
 
 61. See Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research 
Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 790 (1992). 
 62. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1141; see also Swenson, supra note 29, at 122. 
 63. Percentages of unpublished opinions also vary. See TSchlanger & Lieberman, supra note 6, at 
165 (8.7%).T 
 64. See, e.g., Swenson, supra note 29, at 123 (criticizing the either or choice of attitudinal or 
legal models); Taha, supra note 41 (utility maximization model). 
 65. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1156. 
 66. Olson, supra note 61, at 786. Looking at the district court of Minnesota, Olson compared 
reported cases with a sample of the total civil caseload and found that civil rights and federal 
regulatory law cases were overrepresented while personal injury cases were underrepresented among 
reported opinions. See also Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: 
Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. OF POL. 206, 213 (1988) (“[T]here are 
a substantial number of unpublished district court decisions which cannot be assumed to be trivial or 
consensual cases.”). 
 67. See generally Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and 
Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7, 15–16 (1999) 
(summarizing literature); but cf. CARP & ROWLAND, supra note 30, at 16–19. Carp and Rowland argue 
that trial court opinions are likely to be representative of those courts’ public function because 
opinions are found in the “overwhelming majority of the more important, policymaking cases that 
come before the lower federal judiciary.” Id. at 18. They estimated that 85–90% of their dataset 
“consist of cases that are somewhat unusual and/or which contain elements that potentially affect 
parties other than those whose case is being litigated.” Id. The remaining 10–15% of opinions “border 
on the trivial.” Id. Thus, although opinions represented “a small part of the real story,” and may be 
“deceptive,” there is “no more rigorous way to gather data on the outcome of cases, short of a review 
of transcripts in each court’s files—a task whose dimensions foreclose the prospect on more than case 
study or sampling . . . .” Id. at 16. In another work, Carp and Rowland argue that opinions “primarily 
reflect the key policy-making, precedent-setting judgments of trial court judges.” ROWLAND & CARP, 
supra note 23, at 21.TP PT 
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continued to test what factors influence judges to publish opinions in the 
reporters, comparing the dataset of opinions with the dataset of all filed 
cases. The orthodoxy generally analyzes two different categories of 
potential influence: variables that are shared by many judges within an 
institution, i.e., “jurisdictional factors,” and variables that are shared by 
each judicial disposition with a given case, i.e., “case factors.” 
a. Jurisdictional Factors 
The orthodoxy has suggested that different trial court jurisdictions 
write more (or less) than others.68 Implicitly, this is a hypothesis that trial 
courts have a culture that affects individual judges’ propensity to explain 
themselves. Regional differences also appear to shape judicial effort.69 
Thus, “relying solely on cases with published opinions will generally 
produce a geographically skewed sample of all cases filed in the United 
States.”70  
The mechanism generating judicial culture is obscure. Recent work in 
appellate courts suggests that a single, particularly hardworking judge can 
sharply change his or her colleagues’ habits of productivity.71 This “great 
judge” theory of judge behavior may be less convincing when applied to 
the trial courts. As a general matter, district court judges have more 
immediate demands on their time than appellate judges, and their ability to 
increase output to mirror a productive colleague is limited.72 Perhaps for 
this reason, as we observe later in this paper, culture changes slowly in the 
 
 
 68. Swenson, supra note 29, at 136; see also TSchlanger & Lieberman, supra note 6, at 165 
(demonstrating the effect of geography on percentage of opinion writing in relationship to case 
terminations).T 
 69. CARP & ROWLAND, supra note 30, at 18. 
 70. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1144; see also Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a 
Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the 
Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1026 n.112 (1995) (noting that Tdistrict 
courts from the Second Circuit produced more opinions than district courts from the Fifth Circuit).T 
 71. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 24–27 (2005) (“ TPosner therefore appears to be at least partially responsible for 
the increase in productivity of published opinions on the Seventh Circuit.”).T 
 72. There are some additional, speculative reasons to believe that district court culture is less 
susceptible to a “great” judge than appellate culture. The work product of appellate courts is largely 
opinions, which are circulated to all members of the court as a matter of practice. Appellate judges sit 
and work together. District court work, as we show, consists of orders and litigation practice, which 
are unique to each judge. Therefore, “great” district judges have less of a chance to signal their 
diligence to their colleagues than “great” appellate judges.  
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district court. Courts known for productivity and opinion writing in one 
generation remain productive, as we explore, in the next.73  
b. Case Factors 
(1) Case Importance and Type 
The orthodoxy has found that judges follow the publication guidelines 
promulgated by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts in deciding 
whether to publish.74 Such studies conclude that “the vast majority of 
published opinions are explications of discretionary policy decisions that 
directly or indirectly allocate value beyond the litigants of record.”75 As 
Siegelman and Donohue remark, if a case “breaks novel legal ground”76 it 
will more likely be published. They analogize judicially explained orders 
to evolutionary mutations.77  
Olson tested importance by looking at the type of case, and found that 
certain categories of cases were underrepresented in reported opinions: 
property, habeas prisoner petitions, forfeiture, contract, and personal 
injuries.78 Further, social security cases were underrepresented because 
judges “do not perceive the cases as involving new legal issues . . . or as 
being important for other reasons.”79 Conversely, some categories were 
overrepresented: particularly, federal statutory law, including civil rights.80 
Olson explained the variance based on the need for a judicial decision, 
arguing that diversity cases were likely to terminate in settlements before 
 
 
 73. Perhaps this stability arises because the local bar shapes and constitutes district courts more 
strongly than appellate courts. 
 74. See David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court 
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 588 (2003); see also Swenson, supra note 29, at 133–34 
(holding all else equal, courts are 8% more likely to publish if opinion complies with guidelines). 
 75. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 23, at 19. 
 76. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1149. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Olson, supra note 61, at 790 tbl.1. Olson examined the publication rate, by subject matter, of 
697 Minnesota district court opinions. The classification of “subject matter” came from the “nature of 
suit” code on the civil sheet which attorneys must check at the time of filing, consisting of 84 different 
case types that Olson further broke down into 13 larger categories. Olson traced each case by docket 
number and considered it published if it was reported on Lexis. For 330 private-plaintiff cases for 
which plaintiff’s attorneys returned questionnaires, Olson further examined whether published cases 
were more important than unpublished cases. The questionnaire provided three different measures of a 
case’s significance, including whether the case was a class action, whether an interest group was 
present on the plaintiff’s side, and whether the plaintiff’s attorney considered the issues within the case 
to be important for reasons other than just his or her client. Olson then compared the attorney’s 
responses regarding what they considered significant to what Lexis reported. Id. at 789–90. 
 79. Id. at 791.  
 80. Id. at 790 tbl.1. 
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significant judicial involvement.81 She also asked lawyers which cases 
they thought were important, and then tracked whether those cases had 
reported opinions. 32% of cases were important to attorneys, but only 9% 
of those cases resulted in an opinion.82 
(2) Judge Characteristics 
Scholars have also spent some time evaluating the effect of judicial 
background on opinion writing.83 There is limited support for the 
hypothesis that judicial age affects the propensity to write.84 Similarly, 
there is mixed evidence on the effects of a judge’s educational 
background,85 race,86 previous prosecutor work experience,87 and political 
affiliation.88 On the other hand, the orthodoxy concludes that perceived 
quality89 and desire to be promoted have significantly positive correlations 
with opinion writing.90  
(3) Party Characteristics 
Several studies have tested the relationship between the parties, their 
counsel, and the likelihood of opinion writing. The dominant hypothesis is 
 
 
 81. Id. at 790–91. 
 82. Id. at 793. 
 83. This work usually is marked by a methodological error of unknown scope. Many authors 
assume that the “judge” will remain fixed during the life of a case, such that one could correlate an 
independent variable (length of a judge’s tenure, etc.) with a case’s outcome. But many cases involve 
multiple judges, especially in jurisdictions that use magistrates as an active part of the dispute 
resolution process. See Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 
935 n.67 (1995) (collecting magistrate judge literature); Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts 
Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2138–41 (1989) 
(discussing magistrate judge practice). 
 84. Taha, supra note 41, at 18 (noting that older judges 8% less likely to write than younger 
judges, but result statistically insignificant); cf. CARP AND ROWLAND, supra note 30, at 17 (quoting 
federal judge who explained that younger judges write more opinions to “impress everyone”). 
 85. Taha, supra note 41, at 19 (no significant effect); Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & 
Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
63, 82 (2005) (no correlation between opinion writing and attendance at an elite law school). 
 86. Compare Morriss et al., supra note 85, at 82 (finding that rationale of district court opinion 
writing was sometimes correlated with race), with Taha, supra note 41, at 11 (finding that race and 
gender did not significantly relate to opinion writing). 
 87. Taha, supra note 41, at 19 (no significant effect). 
 88. See, e.g., Taha, supra note 41, at 21 (no significant relationship with partisan affiliation). 
 89. Id. at 19 (ABA rating significant). 
 90. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Morriss et 
al., supra note 85 (finding a relationship between progressive ambition and opinion writing in 
sentencing guideline cases); Taha, supra note 41, at 21–23 (discussing promotion and political 
effects). 
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that judges write more for powerful audiences to advance career goals.91 
Judges are said to write more often in cases with more lawyers92 and when 
complaints contain higher amounts in controversy.93  
D. A Behavioral Model of Opinion Writing 
Behavioral law and economics challenges any simple, rational account 
of judicial motivation.94 This challenge is so severe that it is surprising that 
studies of opinion writing have not, to date, considered how judges’ 
explanatory practices are shaped by cognitive bias. In this Article, we offer 
a preliminary, and admittedly simplistic, behavioral model of opinion 
writing. This model is necessarily incomplete and contestable. But failures 
in our model’s explanatory power do not result merely from our demerits: 
one important conclusion of behavioral research is that it is “difficult to 
predict what individuals will do,” as preferences (and thus decisions) are 
manipulable.95 
A behavioral account of opinion writing, like the conventional 
orthodoxy, starts by acknowledging that judges face an array of hard 
choices when trying to maximize the use of their time. Some jurists 
therefore posit that judges will “expend the greatest effort on deciding 
cases in areas in which the opinion will bring the judge prestige and other 
reputational benefits.”96 These areas will be either personal to the judge,97 
or those which normally receive mainstream attention (e.g., “first 
amendment cases”).98 Thus, at least on one view, behavioralism would 
support the importance and demographic hypotheses. 
But this view does not account for the effect of reversal on trial judges’ 
self-esteem, nor the ability of judges to control the risk that their decisions 
will be reversed. Even rational judges might worry about reversal rates.99 
 
 
 91. There are alternative stories one might tell. Perhaps judges write more opinions before such 
parties because the briefs are better and clearer to understand, or because counsel filter cases that are 
worth the court’s time.  
 92. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 15, at 1150. 
 93. Id. at 1152. 
 94. For a literature review of behavioralism, together with a critique of some of its applications, 
see Hoffman, supra note 25, at 546–48. 
 95. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 547. 
 96. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Options, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 
104 (2002) (internal parentheses omitted). 
 97. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 145 (1994) (“[Hand] 
enjoyed mastering new fields [of law] . . . .”). 
 98. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 96, at 104. 
 99. Our focus here is the trial court judge. Federal appellate judges are probably less concerned 
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Some hypothesize that reversal decreases chance of promotion100 and 
reduces the opportunities available to a retiring judge due to diminished 
reputation.101 That said, in reality, reversal is uncommon. 
Studies have found that between 10 and 25% of the federal trial court 
cases that are appealed are reversed.102 But this is a deeply misleading 
statistic. In 2006 the trial courts terminated 198,646 cases, but parties 
commenced only 32,201 cases in the courts of appeal. The appellate 
courts, in turn, decided 12,338 cases on the merits.103 Ultimately, 
notwithstanding the tremendous mass of litigation oozing up from below, 
the courts of appeal reversed or remanded a mere 1,891 cases.104 Thus, the 
effective reversal rate of trial court orders is significantly lower than the 
reversal rate found in appellate decisions, and is below 1%.105 In view of 
these statistics, we doubt that rational judges would change their opinion-
writing practices to reduce a reversal risk, especially when professional 
(legal) norms would push in a contrary direction. 
That said, this rare reversal risk is the only substantive professional 
sanction that federal trial judges ordinarily face.106 Reversal entails unique  
 
 
about reversal. They write as a part of panels, reducing the attribution of wrongdoing on reversal. The 
Supreme Court has also rejected the idea of Supreme “error-correction,” which is to say that reversal 
of appellate court precedent is almost always a matter of differing normative or political priorities, and 
not mistake. See generally Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1484–85 (2003) (suggesting reasons to doubt that appellate judges are strongly 
affected by reversal, and finding support for the legal model of appellate decision making). 
 100. Morriss et al., supra note 85, at 63–96. 
 101. The evidence of the effect of post-retirement opportunities on judicial behavior is concededly 
mixed. See Jerome A. Maddox, Do Judicial Salaries Matter? State Appellate Judge Career Decisions 
and the Opportunity Costs of State Judicial Service (on file with authors). 
 102. John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive 
Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 123, 126 (2006) (“[T]he rate of reversal of the court below in 
appeals decided by the federal courts of appeals has fallen sharply, from not quite twenty-eight percent 
in 1955 to eighteen percent in 1975 and roughly ten percent in 2005.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying 
Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 778 (2006) (noting 
that the 1960 reversal rate of 24.5% had declined to 9.4% by 2003); cf. Jon O. Newman, A Study of 
Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632 tbl.1 (1992) (finding that the Second Circuit had 
reversed trial court opinions at a 24% rate over the preceding two years). 
 103. See STATISTICS DIVISION, U.S. COURTS ADMIN. OFFICE STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2006 tbls.C-4, B-1 & B-5 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec06/ 
index.html.  For Tables B-1 and B-5, criminal cases, original petitions, and administrative cases have 
been excluded. 
 104. See id. at tbl.B-5 (adding together the reversed and remanded cases from 2006, while 
excluding criminal cases, original petitions, and administrative cases).  
 105. See also Newman, supra note 102, at 637–38. Judge Newman concludes that although the 
Second Circuit’s reversal rate was 24%, the percentage of civil cases terminated on the merits that 
were reversed was less than 1%. Id. Judge Newman also notes that “[l]itigants and lawyers are 
accepting the judgments of district courts in the overwhelming percentage of cases, and are appealing 
only the group of cases for which there appears to be some reasonable prospect of reversal.” Id. 
 106. Cf. Marc O. DeGirolami, Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal Judges, 10 
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psychological costs.107 It might also result in perceived decrease in 
political power.108 As the Tnewly developed cultural-status model of risk 
aversion explains, individuals will consider as particularly significant and 
odious hazards that affect his or her place within a group ranking.109 For 
trial courts, reversal is just such a low-probability threat with a high-
emotional valence.110 
Appellate court opinions signal that explanations and reversal are 
correlated. When reversing trial court work, appellate judges often 
comment on the lack of a written opinion.111 Conversely, when affirming, 
 
 
TEX. J. C.L.& C.R. 111, 114 (2005) (stating that from 1799 through 2005, only thirteen federal judges 
were tried for impeachment by the Senate). 
 107. See Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge’s Decision-Making, 
39 MERCER L. REV. 937, 949 (1988) (“The inevitable narcissistic desire not to be reversed will 
influence greatly the judge’s writing process.”); see also James M. Fischer, Discretion and Politics: 
Ruminations on the Recent Presidential Election and the Role of Discretion in the Florida Presidential 
Election Recount, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 807, 846 n.139 (2001) (“TLike the Shakespearean lady who ‘doth 
protest too much, me thinks,’ the District Judges’ expression [disclaiming feelings about reversal] 
masks the exactly opposite internal reality.”).  
 108. See Klein & Hume, supra note 74, at 579 (finding that on balance, judges act as “faithful 
agents of their higher court principals”). However, the evidence of the effect of reversal is weakened 
by a lack of empirical data. See Sara Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis 
of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alternation of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 534 (2002) 
(explaining that literature on compliance is “eclectic”). Part of the problem of aggregating data on 
judicial reversals is that “the message that the judge receives from having a decision reversal . . . may 
. . . be affected by who made the decision.” Joseph L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial 
Reversals: Theoretical Considerations and Data from a District Court, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 28, 33 (2006) 
(reporting on a study of the D.C. District Court opinions and finding that district courts respond to 
reversal rates by changing the content of their decisions). 
 109. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race, 
and Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 86, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762. 
 110. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TLAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
26 (2005) (asserting that members of the public are irrationally fearful of “low-probability risks”); but 
cf. DTan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1071, 1083–87 (2006) (describing how a cultural model of risk perception offers a more nuanced 
view than Sunstein’s rational/irrational dichotomy). That individuals overweigh low-probability or 
high-valence risks does not mean that they are resigned to them. To the contrary, individuals are 
generally risk-seeking with respect to future losses. Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In 
Praise of Investor Irrationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 542, 555 
(2005) (discussing risk-aversive behavior with respect to future gains and risk-seeking when facing 
potential losses). 
 111. See, e.g., TInterfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., TT426 F.3d 694, TT713 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Where the opinion of the district court ‘is so terse, vague, or conclusory that we have no basis to 
review it, we must vacate the fee-award order and remand for further proceedings.’” (quoting Gunter 
v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000))); TTIn re MRRM, P.A., TT404 F.3d 863TT, 
867 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting the court’s reservations about the “conclusory nature of the district court’s 
order allocating the fee”); TTU.S. v. Nuzzo, TT385 F.3d 109TT, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is undisputed that the 
District Court’s explanation of its decision to depart [downward from guidelines] was conclusory and 
limited to a sentence in the written order and judgment invoking a provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”); Edwards v. Wyatt, 335 F.3d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court failed in its 
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the courts of appeal go out of their way to complement trial court 
explanations.112 Although empirical evidence on whether opinions reduce 
reversal rates is at best ambiguous,113 it is possible that trial judges believe 
that writing can protect them from shame.114 
If this belief were widely held, judges would write opinions in support 
of orders they believed would be appealed. We call this the reversal 
hypothesis. This effect will be strongest in two types of situations: (i) 
where the judge believes that the type of case at issue is susceptible to 
appeal; and (ii) where the procedural posture makes appeal likely.  
We will discuss this procedural effect more below. However, the reader 
may appreciate a short explanation of the “case type” effect. There are 
reasons to think that a trial court will obtain signals about the likelihood of 
appeal during litigation. The judge might learn (from the vehemence of 
their oral arguments) of their parties’ passion to continue fighting. She 
might know the lawyers and realize that the litigation will affect a series of 
cases, thus requiring a final appellate statement on the law. And, of course, 
she can look at the issues to be decided and realize that they are extremely 
controversial or novel. Conversely, she might learn during settlement 
discussions facts about the parties’ wealth that make appeal unlikely. Only 
some of these factors will be visible to an outside observer, and a judge 
will learn more about the likelihood of appeal the longer a case survives 
before her.  
We also acknowledge a serious causation problem. The reversal 
hypothesis posits that judges are more likely to write opinions in orders 
likely to be appealed: that is, the potential for appeal causes opinions. But 
 
 
opinion to express its reasoning or findings having to do with the alternate . . . .”); Pasquino v. Prather, 
13 F.3d 1049, 1050 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Because the district court failed to articulate adequately the 
ground for its decision, we must vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case to permit the 
district court to provide a more plenary explanation for its decision . . . .”). 
 112. See TWestland Holdings, Inc. v. Lay, 462 F.3d 1228, 1230 TT(10th Cir., 2006) (“[We agree] with 
the well-reasoned opinion of the district court . . . . [and] as we have on other appropriate occasions, 
we formally adopt the decision, attached as an appendix hereto, as our own.”); TTWeber v. Iowa State 
Bank and Trust Co. of Fairfield, Iowa, TT457 F.3d 857, T859 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[As evidenced by its] 
Texpansive and well-reasoned opinion . . . . the district court properly dismissed [the] claim.”); TTFasano 
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., TT457 F.3d 274, TT287 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[We] count ourselves fortunate to 
have the benefit of a very well-reasoned opinion of Judge Padova of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania . . . .”); TTBancInsure, Inc. v. Marshall Bank, N.A., TT453 F.3d 1073, TT1077 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming “the well-reasoned opinion of the district court in all respects”); TTHarrell v. U.S., TT443 F.3d 
1231TT, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with and adopting fully “the well-reasoned opinion of the 
district court . . .”); TTEvans v. UnumProvident Corp., TT434 F.3d 866, TT879 (6th Cir. 2006).T 
 113. See supra note 108. 
 114. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. It is possible that the legal system might have 
behavioral reasons for encouraging opinion writing. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 
22, at 36–38 (discussing the benefits and costs of using opinion-writing as a debiasing technique). 
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what if opinions cause appeals? A losing party may see an opinion as a 
signal of the difficulty of the issues, making the case a better candidate for 
appellate review. Or, perhaps, some unknown other factors increase the 
likelihood of opinions and appeals.115 The data do not exclude the “appeals 
cause opinions” link that we have hypothesized, but the causative direction 
is inconclusive.116 Ultimately, we conclude that further research will be 
needed to support the reversal hypothesis.  
A second behavioral hypothesis rests on the observation that trial 
judges care about their reputation before a variety of audiences, not just 
the court of appeals.117 We have already discussed the role of audience 
with respect to advancement within the judicial hierarchy. It is true that 
trial judges seeking promotion may take care to cultivate reputations as 
thoughtful or ideologically acceptable. But this external story of 
reputation-seeking is incomplete. As Bainbridge and Gulati observe, “[t]he 
most important audience is likely to be that of other judges.”118 Other trial 
judges may believe that the best kinds of judges are those which dispose of 
cases quickly through settlement. 
This role of trial judges as managers has been well explored in the 
literature,119 but the constant tweaking of the legal landscape necessary to 
dispose of their dockets has to date been underappreciated.120 In particular, 
scholars have been insufficiently attendant to the shaming sanctions that 
judges face if they fall too far behind on their docket.121 In essence, 
 
 
 115. We are grateful to Margo Schlanger, Craig Green, and other readers for this useful critique. 
 116. Conversations with district court clerks suggest that trial courts do structure their decision-
making practices to avoid appeal, though the evidence here too is mixed. Similarly, the words of some 
judges support our story. See supra notes 44–47. Additionally, as reader Jeff Dunoff suggests, perhaps 
longer opinions discourage appeals and thus reduce the risk of reversal. Such is the case, he suggests, 
in the context of disputes arising in the World Trade Organization. 
 117. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 32–39 (2006) (describing the basic implications of an audience-centered view of judicial 
behavior). 
 118. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 96, at 107. 
 119. One starting point is with TJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. T374 T (1982), 
which suggests how judges manage cases rather than decide them. T 
 120. Cf. Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 745, 766 n.135 (1992) (noting that judges rarely write opinions in cases that settle or 
which end in jury verdicts). 
 121. These shaming sanctions flow from the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), T28 U.S.C. § 476(a) 
(2000). Congress enacted the CJRA to improve the quality of the process of civil litigation by 
addressing the problems of excessive cost and delay. See TMichael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation 
Privileges: Lessons from the Civil Justice Reform Act, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). T he CJRA 
process publicly monitors the outcomes of motions and trials in each court. It requires the 
Administrative Office to report to Congress and the public biannually the number of motions pending 
for longer than six months for each judge, the number of bench trials not decided for more than six 
months, and the number of cases that have not been resolved within three years. See Joseph R. Biden, 
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Congress (through the Administrative Office) publishes a list naming 
judges whose dockets are too full. Such dilatory judges face the gentle 
ribbing of their fellows at the judicial lunch table and the harsh glare of the 
media spotlight.122 
Such sanctions can be ameliorated by gaining a reputation as a docket-
managing, settlement-encouraging judge. One obvious way to expedite 
dockets is to write fewer opinions.123 But a more subtle approach is to find 
ways to encourage settlement. The public and bar often praise judges for 
bringing about settlements and rarely vilify them.124 The bench has several 
powerful tools in its arsenal to settle cases. One important technique is a 
judge’s ability to manipulate rulings early in cases (i.e., where the 
likelihood of appeal is low) to give both parties partial victories. In such 
compromise decisions, as behavioral research teaches, neither party will 
be endowed with excessive attachment to past victories and both parties 
will be risk-averse about the possibility of future defeats.125  
We hypothesize that judges—consciously or not—avoid irrational 
party endowment through opinion writing.126 Holding all else equal, we 
 
 
Jr., TCongress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, T46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1294 n.61 (1994); Tsee 
also John Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Independence in a Democracy: Institutionalizing 
Judicial Restraint, in NORMS AND THE LAW 177 (2006) (criticizing CJRA for undermining judicial 
independence). TIn the end, t The CJRA program as implemented had little effect on time to disposition, 
litigation costs, satisfaction, or views of fairness. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND 
INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9027/index1.html. 
 122. See, e.g., John Council, The Slowpoke Report: Claims Based on Old Prison Litigation Show 
up in 2006, TEX. LAW., Jan. 1, 2007, at 6 (discussing Judge Furgeson’s delayed docket); John Council, 
The Slowpoke Report: Hurricane Rita Hampers Hand-Downs, TEX. LAW., Jan. 2, 2006, at 1 
(discussing Judge Heartfield’s delayed docket); Brendan Stephens, U.S. Judges Trim Backlog of Older 
Cases, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 7, 1998, at 1 (analyzing Northern District of Illinois and naming 
overdue judges).  
 123. Indeed, there is some evidence that there is a tradeoff between opinion writing and finishing 
judicial work in a timely way. FLANDERS, supra note 45, at 58–59 (observing inverse relationship 
between opinion writing and case terminations per judge). 
 124. A search in Westlaw’s electronic version of the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary [AJF 
Database] for the term “good settlement judge” produced 19 hits; a search for “settlement judge” 
produced 52 hits, all reflecting a positive value that lawyers put on settlement. But cf. Owen M. Fiss, 
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing against ADR procedures). The explanation in 
the text above refers only to civil cases. The “settlement” of criminal cases by plea bargaining is more 
controversial. 
 125. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
113, 147–48 (1996) (discussing how a party’s views of his rights may change during the litigation as a 
result of psychological endowment); see also Thierry Post et al., Deal or No Deal? Decision Making 
Under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show (EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper, June 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636508 (discussing effect of earlier near losses on future risk assessment). 
 126. Whether judges are conscious of their own behavioral biases and the strategies they use to 
ameliorate them is basically immaterial, and is in any event, a distinction that the data do not speak 
about. See generally Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1127, 
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expect orders early in cases or where the parties obtain complete victories; 
compromises and late dispositions should be more likely to manifest in 
opinions. This is the settlement hypothesis.127  
Thus, this Article offers a direct challenge to opinionology’s structural 
and motivational assumptions about trial court rhetoric. We believe that 
the orthodoxy’s empirical findings rely on an inappropriate dataset—
cases—and rest on theoretical assumptions about human nature which are 
problematic. We summarize our challenge in the Table below. In 
Appendix C, we list the variables we have evaluated and their relationship 
to our hypotheses. In the next Part, we describe the data used to test these 
competing hypotheses. 
 
 OPINIONOLOGY DOCKETOLOGY 
Structural Unit of 
Analysis  
The Case The Judicial Order 
Motivational 
Assumptions 
Rational Actor Model Cultural Status Anxiety; 
Cognitive Bias 
Affecting All Parties 
Specific Factors 
Likely to Increase 
Opinion Writing 
Case importance; 
inexperienced, 
ambitious, and 
minority judges; 
geography; party 
wealth. 
Procedural posture; case 
importance; minority 
judges; interaction with 
settlement and party 
endowment; geography. 
 
 
1137 (1991) (describing the difficulty in distinguishing between conscious and nonconscious 
precursors to action). 
 127. Our hypothesis does not address the content of judges’ discovery decisions. Cf. Joel L. 
Schrag, Managerial Judges: An Economic Analysis of the Judicial Management of Legal Discovery, 
30 RAND J. ECON. 305 (1999) (modeling inverse relationship between availability of early discovery 
and the chances of settlement). Nor does this hypothesis exclude other explanations for why opinion 
writing early in litigation would be rare. For example, perhaps trial courts internalize a sense of role, 
and do not want to give parties the appearance of partiality early in litigation, before such views would 
be appropriate. Similarly, judges are usually politically savvy and are selected (in part) because they 
rarely offend. Thus, they may be disposed to seek decision-making strategies that reduce conflict and 
tend to resist making one party angry at an early stage in the life of a case. We are in debt to Laura 
Little for these alternative possibilities. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Methodology  
We began by selecting four jurisdictions to study. We had two goals in 
creating a sample: (1) to find jurisdictions that had adopted electronic 
docketing by 2003, permitting complete information for most complicated 
cases; and (2) to find jurisdictions whose case filing in 2003 contained 
types that were fairly like the national averages. Ultimately, we decided to 
focus on the District of Maryland, the Northern District of California, the 
Southern District of New York (SDNY), and the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (EDPA).128 
Having selected the jurisdictions, we trained law students to code each 
judicial action taken in 250 cases filed in 2003.129 For each docket, the 
students recorded from the docket header a variety of factors concerning 
each judicial action: docket number, order type, jury demand, basis of 
jurisdiction, type of case, and total docket entries, to name but a few. For a 
subset of cases, our coders added other factors, including number and 
character of parties and counsel, whether an opinion issued, the dates of 
various orders, the result of the order, and the writing judge’s demographic 
characteristics.130  
To reduce data collection error, we undertook “dry run” coding 
sessions with each of our coders. We validated the data by observing and 
eliminating impossibilities (e.g., a case with a higher value of days 
pending than total duration). Finally, we audited various selections of the 
data.131  
 
 
 128. For more detail on the Sample, see infra Appendix A-1. 
 129. The civil justice wheel distributes each case through the courthouse door to a random judge. 
We chose the 1,500th case of the year to start because two of our jurisdictions did not start e-filing 
until March 2003 (the busiest jurisdiction filed its 1,500th case in early March).  
 130. These variables are further defined in Appendix C. 
 131. Our final audit observed an error rate of 1%. We selected 100 cases at random and compared 
the results to that recorded by the coders, looking at four key categories: the type of order, the result of 
the order, the result of the case, and the type of case. We found a 1% error rate in these 100 cases. We 
did not, however, perform an inter-coder reliability analysis, as we failed to originally record which 
student coded which jurisdiction, and did not systematically ask students coding the same jurisdiction 
to check their reliability. We estimate the highest source of error is the result variable: it is hard to tell 
who wins some types of orders. Similarly, we believe that there may be errors in order type, which 
reflects difficulties that can sometimes result when different jurisdictions label types of orders in 
different ways (in particular, the relationship between district judges and magistrates). 
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B. Descriptive Statistics 
We begin by describing the data. After accounting for corrupted 
entries,132 there were 980 cases and 5,736 unique dispositions.133 The four 
jurisdictions displayed similar numbers of total judicial activity,134 
averaging between 5.59 and 6 orders per case.135 However, as Figure 1 
demonstrates, the distribution of docket entries per case—a very crude 
measure of procedural complexity—demonstrates a declining curve. The 
first lesson from our data is this: most cases are procedurally simple.136 
FIGURE 1: A HISTOGRAM OF DOCKET ENTRIES PER CASEP∗P 
 ∗ The number of docket entries is on the horizontal axis and the total number of 
cases with that number of docket entries on the vertical axis. This figure illustrates 
that almost 600 cases had fewer than 15 docket entries, while fewer than 10 cases 
had more than 150 entries. 
 
 
 132. Repeated entries were the most common. Some cases appear to have been mistakenly 
docketed twice. We deleted such cases on review.  
 133. Maryland had 248 cases; New York 247; Pennsylvania 237; and California 248. 
 134. Maryland had 1,456 orders; New York 1,482; Pennsylvania 1,412; and California 1,386. 
 135. Maryland had 5.87 orders/case; New York 6 orders/case; Pennsylvania 5.96 orders/case; and 
California 5.59 orders/case. 
 136. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 6, at 272 (observing that the “vast majority” of patent disputes 
settle); David M. Trubeck et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 83–84 (1983) 
(ordinary cases resolved quickly). 
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The jurisdictions differed significantly in terms of total opinions 
produced, from a high of 1 opinion per 2.6 cases in Pennsylvania to a low 
of 1 opinion per 12.4 cases in California.137 As predicted, Westlaw 
collected more opinions than Lexis.138 Overall, of the 5,736 judicial 
actions we recorded, only 178—3%—came accompanied by opinions.139  
Of the 5,736 orders, 4,631 (or 81%) were “ministerial”: orders 
scheduling cases, approving settlements, issuing judgments, referring to 
magistrates or mediation, and managing the docket (including transfer to 
the multi-district litigation panel). These judicial acts are routine and never 
apply precedent. They are mere exercises in managerial power. Here, 
judges act most clearly as bureaucrats, running their courtrooms and 
churning cases.140 Interestingly, the number of ministerial orders varied by 
case, judge, and jurisdiction.141 
Ministerial orders never lead to opinions. (Imagine the opinion that 
would attempt to explain why a judge had decided to permit an 
adjournment of a three o’clock phone conference until half past three.) As 
it turns out, only half of cases require judges to do anything more than 
issue a few ministerial orders before the parties settle. Of the 980 cases we 
observed, 496 contained only ministerial orders; the remaining 484 cases 
contained both ministerial and what we came to think of as “hard” (non-
ministerial) orders. (Cases containing hard orders we called “difficult 
cases.”) 
 
 
 137. Maryland had 21 opinions; New York 45; Pennsylvania 92; and California 20.  
 138. All opinions collected by Lexis were present on the Westlaw database, while 40 opinions 
were on Westlaw but not Lexis. This result generally confirms that, for historical data, Westlaw is a 
better source for data collection of trial court opinions. The effect was different between jurisdictions. 
In New York and Pennsylvania, the databases were essentially identical. In California and Maryland, 
by contrast, Lexis’ collection was significantly smaller than West’s. Generally, we expected this result, 
as both anecdote and scholarship suggest that Lexis’ opinion-collection practices are less complete 
than Westlaw’s, especially for historical opinions. See Debra Baker, Treading on Titans’ Turf, 86 
ABA J. 44 (2000) (noting Lexis originally compiled its database by hiring workers to type out 
Westlaw’s database). 
 139. Thus, 18% of total cases resulted in an opinion. This is well within the range established by 
the existing literature. See supra notes 61–63. 
 140. For more on judges as bureaucrats, see MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: 
DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). 
 141. For example, judges in the Southern District of New York issue proportionally more 
ministerial orders, particularly scheduling orders, than any other district. 
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Difficult cases survive, on average, three months longer than cases with 
only ministerial orders.142 Difficult cases are more likely to be federal 
question cases143 but less likely to contain jury demands.144 14% of 
difficult cases led to an appeal, while 21% settled. However, difficult cases 
exhibit much of the same distribution of complexity as the bigger dataset. 
Figure 2-a uses a survival analysis to calculate the likelihood that at any 
given time a given difficult case has not yet terminated. Thus, for example, 
looking at the 400 day mark on the horizontal axis, we estimate that there 
is a 50% chance that a case will have terminated. Figure 2-b considers 
survival per jurisdiction, and shows how different courts manage their 
dockets at different rates: at 400 days, we estimate that there is a 70% 
chance that a case from New York will still be pending, but only 30% 
chance in Maryland. 
 
 
 142. The total cases database had an average duration of 380 days. The subset of difficult cases 
had an average duration of 461 days. 
 143. In the total cases database, 73% asserted federal question jurisdiction while 27% asserted 
jurisdiction based on diversity. In the database containing only difficult cases, the ratio was 79% to 
21%. 
 144. In the total cases database, 49% contained jury demands and 51% did not. In the difficult 
cases database, the ratio was 42.5% to 57.5%. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
712 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:681 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2-A: PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL 
ACROSS ALL DIFFICULT CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2-B: PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL ACROSS 
ALL DIFFICULT CASES, BY JURISDICTION 
 
 
Survival may be affected by factors other than the sitting court. For 
example, as Figure 3 demonstrates, cases that ended in settlements appear 
to have different survival characteristics than cases that did not.  
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FIGURE 3: SURVIVAL OF CASES ACROSS ALL JURISDICTIONS, 
CONTROLLING FOR WHETHER THE CASE EVENTUALLY SETTLED 
 
As the reader can see, cases that eventually settle begin “life” 
appearing more complicated than the ordinary case but quickly begin to 
“die off.” Thus, at 200 days, we predict that almost every case that will 
eventually settle is still pending, while at 800 days, we predict that the 
likelihood of such settling cases remaining alive is almost zero. By 
contrast, at 800 days, we predict a 20% likelihood that a non-settling case 
will still be pending. One lesson from these data reinforces our settlement 
hypothesis: judges should wait to act in cases that may potentially settle 
until late in the life of the case, as almost all cases that will settle do so 
within three years of the filing date.  
Because our project questions why judges write opinions, we focused 
just on orders that were “hard” and ignored the ministerial orders. In other 
words, we dropped cases that contained only easy orders from our 
analysis. Although the question of why some cases are easier than others is 
important, it is beyond the scope of this Article.  
In all, we coded 1,091 hard orders in the 484 remaining cases, 
averaging 2.25 orders per case.145 These hard orders came in over fifty 
 
 
 145. The total cases database averaged 5.85 orders per case.  
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different types.146 Figure 4 describes the relationship between the top 
twenty order types. 
FIGURE 4: THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HARD ORDERS REPRESENTED 
BY THE TOP TWENTY HARD ORDER TYPES 
 
 
Motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and discovery orders comprise 
the majority of hard judicial orders in the database. But the figure 
demonstrates the wide variety of orders produced by trial judges, most of 
which, as we explore, are never fully explained and thus are not read by 
non-parties to lawsuits. 
 
 
 146. See infra Appendix A for a further description of how we categorized orders. 
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We observed over fifty different kinds of procedural posture that could 
lead to a judicial action.147 We reduced these possibilities to three major 
types, determined by the relationship between the kind of motion and the 
likelihood that it would be appealed. The first, “management orders,” are 
rarely immediately appealable (discovery is a prime example).148 Such 
orders result from decisions early in cases, and if denied lead to further 
work in the trial court most of the time. Moreover, they are traditionally 
seen as part of the docket-management task that is left to the trial court’s 
discretion. Trial courts rarely expect such orders to be appealed. 
The second type, “intermediate orders,” result in appeals only some of 
the time (motions to dismiss are paradigmatic).149 The final category is 
“final action orders,” which are almost always conclusive and appealable 
(like granting summary judgment).150  
Management orders represented 33.5% of the orders, but only 24% of 
the total opinions. Intermediate action orders represented 41.1% of orders, 
but only 34% of opinions. Final action orders presented the remaining 
25.4% of orders, but almost half (42%) of opinions.151  
These proportions support the reversal hypothesis. However, to fully 
explore that relationship, we require a regression analysis.  
 
 
 147. See infra Appendix A.2, Table A-1. 
 148. Orders included in this category were: class certification, discovery orders, stays, contempt 
orders, appointment of masters, motions in limine, in-trial orders, motions to intervene, attorney’s fees 
orders, motions to amend, joinder petitions, motions for an interlocutory appeal, and writs of 
execution. We acknowledge that some of these orders, in particular, class certification decisions, are 
subject to special discretionary appeals. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Such appeals do not stay 
proceedings in the district court unless the district court or the court of appeals so orders. Id. See 
generally Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833–35 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting wide 
discretion to consider appeals, but suggesting that such review should be exercised carefully). 
 149. Orders included in this category were reports and recommendations (on motions to dismiss, 
prisoner petitions, summary judgment, and miscellaneous matters), motions to remand, transfer, 
dismiss, for a temporary restraining order, for a preliminary injunction, for reconsideration, to vacate 
default judgment, and combinations of either the previous order types or between these order types and 
“management orders.” Remand orders, as a special case, were difficult to categorize. Although they 
are not ordinarily appealable, they nevertheless occasion substantial briefing because they are 
dispositive when granted.  
 150. Orders included in this category were judgments on the pleadings, summary judgments, 
permanent injunctions, post-trial motions, enforcements of judgment, writs of attachment, 
miscellaneous dispositive orders, forfeitures, arbitration, combinations of the previous order types, and 
combinations between these order types and either intermediate or management order types. (Thus, if a 
summary judgment order were to be paired with a motion to dismiss, the resulting judicial disposition 
would be in the final order category.)  
 151. Some readers of this paper in draft have suggested that because our categories do not 
differentiate between the winners and losers of orders, there is a potential for confounding. We discuss 
this issue at greater length infra note 161.  
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
If we were to adopt the opinionologists’ structural error and assume 
that judges only write opinions once during a case, our data would confirm 
the orthodoxy. A “kitchen sink” regression, including all of the variables 
in Appendix C, found that multiple variables changed the likelihood of 
opinion writing at significant levels. On that list are: firm wealth, number 
of lawyers, case types, judge experience, judge demographics, and the 
length of time a case was pending before the disposition issued. 
But this regression would mislead. Traditional techniques of statistical 
inference assume that the observations (in our case, the dispositions) are 
independent of one another. Our data, by contrast, consist of variables that 
characterize individual dispositions, but these dispositions also form part 
of the history of a larger entity: the case itself. Furthermore, cases are also 
nested within an even larger entity: the jurisdiction. Variables that 
characterize dispositions within the same case are more similar than 
variables that characterize dispositions in different cases; cases within the 
same jurisdiction may be more similar than cases in different 
jurisdictions.152 An illustration may help: 
 
 
 152. This is not to say that a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case in 
New York is more like an admiralty case in New York than a RICO case in Pennsylvania, but that the 
case’s opinion-writing characteristics will share a jurisdictional culture of opinion writing of unknown 
strength. 
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The technical description for these data in statistics is “hierarchical.” 
Hierarchical data require evaluation by special statistical models.153 A 
“hierarchical linear model” (HLM) controls for dispositions within a case 
that resemble each other and cases within jurisdictions that share cultural 
 
 
 153. Specifically, the model is a linear logistic model with hierarchical structure on the input 
variables. The left-hand-side of the model is a logit transformation of a probability: log(p/(1-p)). The 
right-hand-side of the model is linear in the parameters (i.e., the unknown coefficients of the 
variables).  
SDNY EDPA
Jurisdictions: Each has a unique 
culture of opinion writing and 
unique methods of distributing 
opinions to Westlaw and Lexis. 
Case 1 Case 2 
Cases: Each case within New York 
shares a culture of writing, but has 
unique case attributes. E.g., each 
case has a case type (civil rights, 
contract, etc.), distinct numbers 
(and wealth) of parties and 
lawyers, and a unique complication 
index. 
Order 1 
Order 2 
Order 3 
Order 4 
Order 5 
Order 6 
Dispositions: Each order shares 
jurisdictional and case factors, but 
has unique dispositional attributes. 
For example, each order is unique 
in its procedural posture and how 
long Case 1 was pending when the 
order issued. 
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characteristics.154 HLM modeling is complex, ordinarily requiring the use 
of specialized software.155 Perhaps as a result, HLM has been employed 
rarely in the law reviews, and this Article marks its first application to the 
court system.156 Nonetheless, we predict that HLM modeling will soon be 
recognized as the most appropriate statistical method to use when 
evaluating the common law. 
In Appendix B, we reproduce the complete results from the 
hierarchical model, together with a full explanation of how such modeling 
proceeds. In the text, we will assume that most readers are less interested 
in why the model works and more interested in the results it produced. 
*    *    * 
Our HLM model decisively rejects the opinionologist orthodoxy. Many 
of the effects predicted by the conventional wisdom—and confirmed by 
our kitchen-sink analysis—were not significantly related to opinion 
writing. For example, the basis of federal jurisdiction, the number and 
wealth of counsel, the complexity of cases, the existence of decisions 
resulting from compromise, the timing of decisions, and the presence of 
federal government all had no significant relationship with opinion 
writing. The effects that we—and others—observed with respect to these 
variables disappear when procedural, jurisdictional, and case type factors 
are taken into account. We observed no relationship between opinion 
writing and any judicial demographic, congestion, or experiential 
characteristic. 
On a more positive note, the HLM model supports our major 
hypotheses, at least in large part.  
 
 
 154. For a description of HLM modeling, see generally ANTHONY S. BRYK & STEPHEN W. 
RAUDENBUSH, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS, 
ADVANCED QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, VOLUME 1 (1992). See also infra 
Appendix B. 
 155. We used the HLM 6 software package, available from Scientific Software International, Inc. 
Other packages are available, including R.  
 156. See, e.g., Paula L. Hannaford et al., The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil 
Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627, 636 (2000) (using HLM model to estimate 
jury behavior); Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) 
Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 777, 
789 (1998) (using HLM model to estimate the relationship between geography and views on crime); 
cf. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a 
Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 288 (2006) (commenting on another HLM 
study). 
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A. Jurisdictional Factors 
As expected, there were important differences between jurisdictions. 
Holding the District of Maryland as the baseline, and controlling for all 
other variables, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Southern 
District of New York produced significantly higher numbers of opinions. 
There was no difference between Northern California’s opinion writing 
and Maryland’s. Similar findings in the past with respect to at least two of 
these jurisdictions suggest that a culture of opinion writing can be fairly 
stable over time.157 
B. Case Factors 
We observed several relationships between case type and opinion 
writing, though those relationships were not ones predicted by prior 
research. Holding all else equal, dispositions within two case types were 
associated with more opinion writing at significant levels: contracts and 
labor cases.158 We found no indication that “important” case types, like 
civil rights cases or those involving the federal government, were more 
likely to result in opinions when dispositional and jurisdictional factors 
were controlled.159 We also found that dispositions within two other types 
of cases were less likely to result in opinions than the average: torts and 
habeas prisoner petitions. 
Second, we found that dispositions within cases that resulted in an 
appeal were more likely to result in opinions.160  
C. Dispositional Factors 
Management orders (e.g., discovery) and intermediate orders (e.g., 
motions to dismiss) were less likely to be opinions than final orders (e.g., 
summary judgment). This result holds even when we control for whether 
that particular procedural order was likely to end the case.161 
 
 
 157. Past research observing only at the case-level found that Maryland had significantly fewer 
opinions per judge than Pennsylvania. FLANDERS, supra note 45, at 57. Further, TSchlanger and 
Lieberman observed a similar high proportion of publication in 2004 for the Southern District of New 
York. See Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 6, at 164.T 
 158. In the text below, all other observations and correlations noted are statistically significant. 
 159. Olson, supra note 61, at 792; see also Swenson, supra note 29, at 133. 
 160. Notably, this variable measures the presence of an appeal at any point during the data 
collection period, not with respect to the disposition at issue. 
 161. At the suggestion of readers, we created two new categories of order which combine the 
order type variable and the result variable: Motion to Dismiss Granted; and Summary Judgment 
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Surprisingly, the identity of the winner or loser of any given order did 
not correlate with opinion writing. Nor were orders that resulted in 
compromises more likely to be opinions than the norm. We found no 
relationship between opinion writing and a judge’s race, gender, high 
workload, or experience. 
D. Predicted Probabilities and Summary 
The model estimates the effect of individual factors on the odds of an 
opinion being written.162 Using the coefficients for each significant factor 
in the model, we can generate “predicted probabilities” for specific 
combinations of variables.163 A predicted probability is a statistical method 
that asks the following question: if we match a certain set of variables to a 
given order, what is the likelihood that a judge will write an opinion?  
Recall that the overall incidence of opinions across jurisdictions was 
178 opinions in 1,091 hard dispositions, or 16.3%. Now, consider a basic 
example where all the significant independent variables were “turned off.” 
That is, imagine a disposition from Maryland or California (not from the 
EDPA or the SDNY); the case was not appealed, nor was it a tort, prisoner 
petition, contract, or labor matter. However, it resulted from a final 
order.164 In that scenario, which we will call the intercept, the probability 
of an opinion being written is 10.9%. 
The next simplest example to consider is the disposition that is exactly 
the same in all the factors as the intercept except that only one variable is 
different. Consider a disposition that is baseline except that it results from 
an intermediate (rather than a final) procedural order. The resulting 
predicted probability of an opinion being written is 5.1%. Now, what if it 
is a disposition arising from a management order? The probability is 3.6%. 
To put it another way, a management order is about one third as likely as 
 
 
Granted. If, as some believe, judges were writing opinions as a result of the case ending, rather than 
merely the likelihood of appeal, we would observe that opinion writing would be indistinguishable as 
between granted motions to dismiss and granted summary judgment motions. But after modeling the 
data in HLM, we found that the procedural effects were distinct: summary judgment (granted) 
produced significantly more opinion writing than motion to dismiss (granted). Summary judgment 
(denied) and motion to dismiss (denied) produced fewer opinions than their positive counterparts. 
Details of this analysis are on file with the authors.  
 162. Due to limitations inherent in a logistic regression, general statements about individual factor 
influences on the probability of an opinion being written are impossible.  
 163. See generally infra Appendix B.  
 164. We must include this variable because the baseline of the model could not incorporate all 
three procedural variables in the same run. It would have failed to converge. Therefore, our baseline 
includes one significant variable effect: we assume that the order was final, and ask how the other two 
procedural types differ, if at all, from that baseline. 
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a final order, all else being equal, to result in an opinion; an intermediate 
order is about half as likely. 
We can repeat this analysis for each of our three different jurisdictions: 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland/California.165 Around each 
predicted probability we include a measure of uncertainty, together with 
the intercept. (Recall that the intercept results from a final action order.) 
Figure 5 displays this analysis. 
FIGURE 5: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF AN OPINION RESULTING FROM 
MANAGEMENT AND INTERMEDIATE ORDERS, BY JURISDICTION* 
* All probabilities are given assuming all other variable values are at baseline (Not 
Appeal, Not Tort, Not Contract, Not Prisoner Petition, Not Labor). For details on 
the calculation, see Appendix B. The horizontal dashes (-) identify the intercept. 
Next, assume that a disposition is at the intercept, but results from a 
case that was appealed. In the average jurisdiction, we predict an opinion 
in 23.6% of dispositions. In New York, we predict an opinion in 64.4% of 
dispositions. Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
 
 165. Recall that we observed no significant differences between the opinion-writing 
characteristics of Maryland and the Northern District of California. 
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FIGURE 6: PREDICTED PROBABILITY ON OPINION RESULTS FROM AN 
ACTION WHERE CASE IS APPEALED, BY JURISDICTION* 
 
* All probabilities are given assuming all variable except for Appeal are at baseline 
(Not Tort, Not Contract, Not Prisoner Petition, Not Labor, Yes Final Order). For 
details on the calculation, see Appendix B. The horizontal dashes (-) identify the 
intercept. 
Next, what are the effects of the different case types? Figure 7 displays 
those findings for each of the case types where we found a significant 
relationship with opinion writing. 
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FIGURE 7: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF AN OPINION RESULTING FROM 
CONTRACT, TORT, PRISONER PETITION, AND LABOR CASES, BY  
JURISDICTION* 
* All probabilities are given assuming all other variable values (apart from the 
labeled value) are at baseline (Not Appeal, Not Any Other Case Type, Yes Final 
Order). For details on the calculation, see Appendix B. The horizontal dashes (-) 
identify the intercept. 
Thus, while the predicted opinion-writing probability for a final-order 
disposition in the Southern District of New York is around 41.8%, the 
probability in a similarly situated contract case is 61.8%, a tort case 
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20.8%, a prisoner petition case 13.3%, and a labor case 66.4%. We include 
the exact figures, including confidence intervals, in the footnote.166 
A highlight from this analysis is the very wide ranges in probabilities. 
For example, we predict that a Southern District of New York judge ruling 
on a summary judgment motion in a labor case will write an opinion 
around 66% of the time. But a District of Maryland or Northern District 
California judge ruling on a summary judgment motion in a habeas 
petition will write an opinion only 2% of the time.167 Or to put it another 
way, we predict that 98% of summary judgment decisions in habeas cases 
from the District of Maryland will not be explained and thus will be 
unavailable to both quantitative empiricists and ordinary law professors 
who seek to know what the “law of habeas” is. 
A second notable result is that two systematic factors, jurisdiction and 
procedure, appear to result in a significant amount of the variation 
observed in the model.  
Overall, the data do not support the judicial demographic hypothesis. 
We found no evidence that a judge’s race, gender, experience, or current 
docket congestion was at all related to his or her opinion-writing practices. 
This finding was startling in light of the common, realist view that judicial 
personality matters to the production of law. Our analysis, by contrast, 
finds no evidence that trial court explanations are demographically 
determined. 
Similarly, the data do not support the importance hypothesis. Unlike 
almost all previous authors, we found no evidence that orders in 
constitutionally salient cases—like civil rights, or habeas petitions—were 
explained in opinions at high rates. Nor did we find that “boring 
administrative law cases”—like social security—were underexplained. We 
found no relationship between federal question jurisdiction and opinion 
 
 
 166. Predicted Probabilities by Percentage (Confidence Intervals in Parentheses). See infra 
Appendix B for a further explanation of how these probabilities were generated. 
 
 NY PA MD/CA 
Appeal 64 (49, 77.4) 54.7 (39, 69.5) 23.6 (14.1, 36.8) 
Tort 20.8 (9.7, 39) 14.9 (6.7, 29.9) 4.3 (1.8, 9.9) 
Contract 61.8 (47.5, 74.4) 51.9 (37.5, 65.9) 21.6 (13.4, 33.1) 
Prisoner Petitions 13.3 (6.3, 25.7) 9.2 (4.3, 18.7) 2.5 (1.1, 5.6) 
Labor 66.4 (42.2, 84.3) 56.9 (32.7, 78.2) 25.3 (11.1, 47.9) 
Management Order 18.2 (11.9, 26.7) 12.9 (8.2, 19.6) 3.6 (2.2, 5.9) 
Intermediate Order 24.1 (16.9, 33.1) 17.4 (11.9, 24.8) 5.1 (3.3, 7.8) 
Intercept 41.8 32.3 10.9 
 
 167. The text above substitutes “summary judgment” for “final order motion” to make the 
example easier to digest. 
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writing. Nor were opinions more likely to result from cases litigated by 
rich law firms, or by those with many lawyers, or where the federal 
government was a party. These results powerfully refute the conventional 
wisdom.168  
With respect to the orthodoxy’s alternatives, the jury is still out. The 
procedural finding alone is not conclusive to prove the reversal hypothesis. 
Nor is our finding that cases that are appealed contain orders that were 
explained at high rates. All of our findings are subject to the problem of 
causation, which is a difficult one to solve with these data.169  
We thus offer some suggestions on ways that the reversal hypothesis 
could be more directly tested in future empirical work. One idea would be 
comparative docketology, looking at common law jurisdictions with 
different rules of appealability than our own, but similar opinion-writing 
processes. For example, imagine if Scotland allowed the immediate appeal 
of discovery orders. A test of the reversal hypothesis would measure if 
Scotland’s discovery orders were explained at higher rates than our own.  
A second idea requires a reversal of the model, asking what factors in 
cases (or orders) are correlated with appeals. If appeals are predicted by 
opinions, it would seem more likely that opinions help lawyers sort “hard” 
cases worthy of further investment from easier ones, or perhaps help 
lawyers make the case to clients that further investment will be rewarded. 
Alternatively, opinions may set the stage for appellate review, identifying 
issues for the appeals court and thus making it cheaper for parties to bring 
and prosecute appellate arguments. Notably, these conclusions would not 
necessarily exclude the reversal hypothesis, as trial judges could believe 
that opinions offer protection from reversal. 
A third project would try to test whether greater insecurity leads to a 
higher rate of explanation. This could lead to a focus on magistrate judges, 
who are largely hired by the district court for fixed terms. However, only 
some magistrate judge orders are directly reviewed by appellate courts, 
 
 
 168. We did not examine whether the individual orders under review were themselves 
controversial or novel: after all, not all constitutional cases contain interesting issues to resolve. But we 
think that we have decisively shifted the burden of proof on opinionologists to justify why they (still 
would) believe that opinions are just like orders, only more interesting. 
 169. As we explained supra at text accompanying note 115, there is a potentially different causal 
direction at work. Assessing causation problems like these requires the use of a statistical method like 
propensity score matching. See generally Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of 
Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983). When input 
variables are hierarchically structured, we would prefer to use multilevel models to estimate such 
scores. Indeed, the practical and theoretical foundations for using propensity scores to evaluate 
multilevel models are currently the active subject of statistics dissertations and research articles. But at 
present, propensity scores cannot be computed using the HLM program.  
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which would make it difficult to study their work directly. Alternatively, 
scholars could expand docketology to focus on state court judges in 
jurisdictions that highlight reversal rate in the election or appointment 
process. Identifying such jurisdictions would be an admittedly hard task, 
particularly because electronic docketing in state courts is still in its early 
stages. 
A fourth test would look for changing rules about an individual 
procedural moment’s appealability. Consider, for example, the evolving 
trend to permit appeals of grants or denials of class certification 
motions.170 To the extent that such a change in the law postdates the 
digitalization of dockets, scholars could analyze if providing for new 
appellate avenues increases the rate of opinion writing. 
Finally, our settlement hypothesis was not well supported. The 
variables most directly linked to the hypothesis—days a case was pending, 
its complexity, and whether it was settled—all were uncorrelated to 
opinion writing. This nonfinding undermines the claim that courts use 
opinions to debias parties and increase the odds of settlement.171  
Putting this hypothesis testing aside, the data revealed many puzzles. 
We understand why prisoners’ petitions and torts are less often 
rationalized through opinions.172 These cases are perceived by judges to be 
nuisances—the routine slip-and-fall, or a habeas petition of dubious 
merit.173 It is less clear why labor and contract cases were more likely to 
be explained through opinions. One explanation might be that such cases 
produce novel problems for federal judges, either because, in the case of 
labor, they are rare or because, in the contracts example, they often arise 
from state law. Another explanation is the judges seek to create certain 
rules for commercial parties. But these are weak explanations. Torts, like 
 
 
 170. See supra note 148. 
 171. For more examples of debiasing, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, TDebiasingT Through 
TLaw T, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–24 (2006). In a way, the procedural finding does provide limited 
support for the settlement hypothesis, as procedural stages may be seen as gates the parties pass 
through, each one increasing the costs of litigation and decreasing the likelihood of settlement. 
Opinions at early procedural stages may increase the chance of parties being overconfident in their 
ability to get to a favorable judgment. A future paper might consider testing this hypothesis by using 
settlement, not opinion writing, as an outcome variable in an evaluation of how and why cases “die.” 
 172. See Olson, supra note 61, at 790. 
 173. However, it is disturbing that prisoners and tort plaintiffs seem to receive less judicial time 
than other similarly situated parties. Such plaintiffs appear to receive less justice. However, that 
normative problem is outside the scope of this paper. One of us has engaged in a dialogue on this topic 
which may suggest where a docketology normative project could lead. Compare Dave Hoffman, Must 
District Judges Give Reasons, Concurring Opinions, July 20, 2006, http://www.concurringopinions. 
com/archives/2006/07/must_district_j_1.html with Lawrence Solum, The Obligation to Give Reasons, 
Legal Theory Blog, July 23, 2006, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/07/. 
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contracts, are often rooted in state law; admiralty claims, like labor, are 
rare. And if judges really wanted to settle commercial expectations, then 
the civil commercial cases—which include securities law and antitrust 
law—would often be explained. Ultimately, we do not believe that these 
kinds of case effects are robust.174 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Docketology challenges the orthodox view regarding why judges write 
opinions. And so what? Does it really matter that some judges may write 
to avoid reversal and not to leave their indelible mark on the law? That the 
dataset of opinions is biased toward events late in the life of litigation? 
This Part considers the broader implications of a docketology approach to 
trial court work. 
In our view, docketology’s main contribution is to starkly expose how 
little trial court work is explained through written opinions. An 
astonishingly low 3% of all orders are available on the databases; more 
than 80% of difficult orders are similarly “hidden” without explanation. 
To date, scholars have simply ignored the content of such orders, 
assuming that judges’ written explanations were fairly representative of 
law. But we have exposed this structural assumption as deeply 
problematic. 
In Section A, we discuss the implications of our findings for empirical 
legal studies, arguably the fastest growing jurisprudential movement in the 
legal academy. For that movement’s adherents, our message is cautionary: 
empirical work about trial courts is more expensive, more time-
consuming, and more uncertain that one might imagine. In Section B, we 
discuss how analysis of trial courts’ hidden work similarly influences 
qualitative legal studies, or, more simply, anyone who wants to understand 
what trial courts do. 
A. Empirical Legal Studies 
Our study recommends great caution in proceeding with quantitative 
analysis of legal opinions.175 The underrepresentativeness of opinions is 
 
 
 174. Previous iterations of our model found that tax was positively related to opinion writing, and 
that civil rights cases were negatively related. The only case types that were consistently significant 
over various models were prisoner petitions and torts. 
 175. See also Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, T69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) 
(offering suggestions to improve methodology in empirical research)T; Gregory Mitchell, Empirical 
Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, T83 N.C. L. REV. 167 T (2004) (proposing disclosure 
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obvious and well known. Nevertheless, many authors have drawn 
exceedingly strong normative claims based on datasets that docketology 
reveals to be substantially biased.  
We offer an example. One of us has previously written an empirical 
article about securities doctrine in the New York federal courts.176 That 
article depended, in part, on content analysis of district court opinions.177 It 
rejected a then-extant hypothesis that judges were applying doctrine in a 
docket-pruning way by chopping a certain percentage of cases from their 
docket at each procedural opportunity. In part, the paper did so by looking 
at the distribution of procedural stages in the opinions dataset.178 This 
analysis was then leveraged to suggest that courts have engaged in a 
wrong normative turn in securities law, privileging some investors at the 
expense of others.179 But docketology confounds that paper’s reliance on 
any conclusions about the relationship between procedure and doctrine. It 
may be right, but opinions do not resolve the issue one way or another. 
Essentially, it is unwise to use databases of trial court opinions—as the 
securities paper and many others like it have done—to infer trends in 
outcomes, the effects of party or judge characteristics, or other potential 
variables.180 It is possible that the only thing such databases measure is 
what judges write in opinions. As we have shown, what judges write in 
opinions is notably distinct from how they manage litigation. 
There is a better way. This Article illustrates how future empirical 
work on trial courts should proceed. The recent availability of electronic 
dockets has the potential to spark a new way forward in empirical legal 
studies that will enable authors to attain a more finely tuned and accurate 
view of what motivates courts’ decisions. The project of studying dockets 
is already ongoing and should soon revolutionize how the new legal 
realists will approach the problem of quantitative research.181 
Docketology may not be a perfect method, especially for those seeking 
empiricism on the cheap. It is labor intensive, requiring legal authors to 
rely on others—coders—who create a risk of translation error.182 It further 
 
 
requirements to enhance the status of empirical legal scholarship). 
 176. Hoffman, supra note 25. 
 177. The article offered the usual apologies. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 568. 
 178. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 573–74. 
 179. Id. at 600–01. 
 180. The use of opinion-only databases to fully capture the work of appellate courts is also 
troubling, because those courts do issue some orders to the parties that are not captured in the 
electronic databases. However, such orders are only rarely substantive, with the notable exception of 
orders related to prisoner litigation. 
 181. See supra note 6. 
 182. Docket coding requires a degree of knowledge about procedure that would make it very 
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costs time and money. We began coding the data for study in 2005, almost 
two years from the date the paper was completed. Along the way, we 
viewed the federal dockets thousands of times, each access costing eight 
cents. Such costs accumulate.183 Most significantly, docketology remains 
impractical in analyzing cases before 2003, when electronic docketing 
gained widespread acceptance in the district courts. Nor is it yet of much 
use for the state courts. Thus, projects looking outside of the federal 
system, or at historical trends, yet remain “prey . . . to the apperceptive 
mass.”184 
But, if we may speculate, the number and availability of electronic 
dockets are on the rise. Recent proposals would make federal trial court 
docket access free.185 Westlaw already has begun to collect federal docket 
entries, making it cheaper for scholars to access such materials. State 
courts will follow suit, and, we hope, records from the past may become 
digitized as well. Empiricists who hope to study trial court work will soon 
find themselves confronted by a wealth of data awaiting careful study. 
B. Doctrine and Judicial Decision Making  
This Article does not intend to play “gotcha” with others’ scholarship. 
Opinionology laudably seeks to improve on the previous approach to 
studying trial court work: divining legal rules from a handful of trial court 
opinions. Indeed, focusing on opinions, whether or not through statistical 
aggregation, makes a great deal of sense, at least in some circumstances. It 
is a traditional and tested approach in a profession where “that’s novel” is 
the worst insult one lawyer can say to another.186 It is cheap and relatively 
easy.187 For appellate courts, opinions do constitute the majority of judicial 
 
 
difficult to use non-law students as coders. 
 183. Ascertaining the exact cost is difficult. Based on information received from the Temple Law 
Library, we estimate that the total docket access charges exceed $700. See Email from TNoa 
Kaumeheiwa, Reference Librarian, Temple University Beasley School of Law, to David A. Hoffman, 
Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with 
author). This is not itself a large sum, although (unlike Westlaw or Lexis access) it is not covered by a 
flat agreement and incorporated into existing library budgeting. 
 184. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 90. 
 185. See Lyle Denniston, Conference Endorses New Records Access, SCOTUSBlog, Mar. 13, 
2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/03/conference_endo.html. 
 186. See Parker, supra note 16, at 901 (“Lawyers, judges, public policy experts, and lawmakers 
rely on reported opinions.”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125 (2002) (“TIn a sense, [studies of opinions] represented a systematization of 
traditional legal research. Instead of reporting the fruits of years of subjective reading of opinions that 
had crossed one’s desk, the legal scholar turned to selecting randomly, coding tirelessly, and then 
analyzing hundreds of cases.”).T 
 187. Docketology, by contrast, was said to be “a task whose dimensions foreclose the prospect on 
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work product, and their rhetoric does create doctrine. And, as we explored, 
opinionology is supported by a rich literature concerning judicial behavior 
arising from the political science and law and economics traditions.188 
At its root, though, the opinionology orthodoxy is motivated by a deep 
assumption about what opinions mean. Noted empiricists Theodore 
Eisenberg and Sheri Johnson explained that opinions are often thought of 
as representative because “they are the full population . . . of the cases 
shaping perceptions of the legal system. Published opinions are all most of 
us ever work from.”189 This insight is the heart of the conventional 
wisdom: trial court opinions should be studied because they help to create 
a public story about what the “law” is. That is, opinions constitute 
“doctrine.” But this conventional account is impoverished on two 
fundamental levels.  
First, it depends on a technological and cultural moment that is passing. 
When dockets become freely available, unexplained judicial orders will 
begin to shape perceptions about the content of legal rules.190 The media 
will distribute orders they find notable, bloggers will dissect the interstices 
of important litigation, and ultimately society at large will come to know 
and appreciate the vast beehive of work that makes up trial court litigation 
practice.  
Second, there are already large numbers of individuals whose views of 
the law are affected by dockets: lawyers. Complaints from lawyers about 
law professors’ distance from legal practice are common. Recent work 
enlisting network theory suggests why: lawyers may share information 
about hidden aspects of the court’s procedural and substantive rules in 
highly efficient ways.191 Such counsel networks function something like 
predictive markets for law, collecting information and “pricing” legal 
outcomes in that the networks influence the decision to file in one 
 
 
more than case study or sampling . . . .” Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Federal District Courts and Urban 
Public Policy: An Exploratory Study (1960–1967), in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 378 (1969); 
see also Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. REV. 49, 56 
(2003) (“Before electronic filing, docket information and case filings enjoyed relative obscurity 
because of the obstacles involved in obtaining the documents. Anyone interested in the contents of a 
case file would have to go to the courthouse, pore over paper files, and pay for copies to be made.”). 
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 41–93. 
 189. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal 
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991) (internal citations omitted, emphasis 
added); see also ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 23, at 21 (“[Opinions] primarily reflect the key policy-
making, precedent-setting judgments of trial court judges.”). 
 190. See Levin, supra note 28, at 50 (making normative argument for free access to judicial work 
product). 
 191. See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation As 
Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863 (2005). 
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courthouse or another.192 The conventional account of doctrine reinforces 
lawyers’ ability to profit from a dissonance between common accounts of 
legal rules and a view informed by a close study of dockets.193  
Docketology, by contrast, at the least exposes the difference between 
opinions and orders and enables a significantly improved account of how 
the common law will evolve.194 Docketology’s promise is thus an 
extension of the digital revolution, and the claims made in this Article 
mirror those made when electronic databases of opinions came online.195  
More fundamentally, docketology offers a way to study litigation that 
informs readers about the real content of legal rights and obligations. For 
example, consider the right to be free from an unlawful touching, enforced 
through a tort liability regime. Docketology gives more meaning to that 
right than was previously available. To recover damages, one must sue, 
and docketology informs us about that lawsuit. This technique allows us to 
answer questions like how long will the litigation take; how much will it 
cost (measured by how many orders it produces); do rich attorneys matter; 
how will discovery proceed; when will settlement likely occur; how will 
the court rule on motions in limine; are transfer motions welcomed; and 
should the parties cross-move for summary judgment. Trial court tort law 
opinions must be measured and contextualized against the litigation that 
produces them. Docketology permits us to accomplish this contextualizing 
task. It enables us to quantify the realities of litigation. 
 
 
 192. Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets 
to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, T100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 T, 1142 (2006) (discussing the 
application of information markets to predicting Supreme Court decisions).  
 193. Lawyer publications are replete with claims that the law “on the ground” is distinct from that 
advanced by law professors. See, e.g., Richard Connelly, Disgruntled Clients Put Bar Policies on 
Firing Line in Citizen’s Sunset Review, T EX. LAW., at 8 T, TApr. 16, 1990 T(“TLaw in the trenches is not 
like law in the ivory tower.”).T 
 194. As Ta recent paper observed:  
TIn short, for anyone who hopes to understand litigation—one specific litigation or an entire field 
of litigation—there is no substitute for court records. Historians, sociologists, anthropologists, 
political scientists, legal researchers, and policymakers all need court records if they are going to 
understand either a type of case or a particular litigation, whether it is individually important or 
studied as an exemplar. There is simply no other source of information about the substantive or 
legal issues, the conduct of disputes, or their resolutions. 
TSchlanger & Lieberman, supra note 6, at 168. T 
 195. See Diana Fitch McCabe, Automated Legal Research: A Discussion of Current Effectiveness 
and Future Development, 54 JUDICATURE 283 (1971) (claiming that OBAR, a computerized legal 
research tool, would help lawyers manage large data sources, reduce the time spent searching, 
equalizing the advantages held by large firms and making representation generally more affordable); 
Robert K. Pezold, Computerized Legal Research—An Arrival, 10 TULSA L.J. 583, 587 (1975) 
(describing LEXIS, a new service, that would provide significantly improved research capabilities for 
lawyers, but noting cost problems). 
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Similarly, docketology may deepen our knowledge about what 
motivates legal actors. Here, we have focused on the role of the opinion. If 
the reversal hypothesis is confirmed by subsequent research, one way to 
view an opinion is as a brief to an appellate court.196  
Understanding that opinions are not only intended to create rules for 
society but also to make a plea against reversal suggests doubt about 
conventional accounts of the relationship between judicial action and 
social behavior. Heroic accounts of judges imagine that they have largely 
instrumentalist, public-regarding goals: deterring wrongdoing, signaling 
good norms, and encouraging legal order.197 But perhaps fear is part of the 
mix as well. 
For some, this view of judges’ self-perception will be disheartening at 
best and, perhaps, deeply shocking. After all, if courts are willing to distort 
the medium of their decision making to avoid an already minor chance of 
reversal, might they be willing to change the content of their message too? 
To shape the facts to make them more robust? To give victory to the party 
more likely to appeal a contrary verdict? These behaviors are said to mark 
the behavior of certain aberrant judges: the legitimacy of the trial courts 
depends on such judges being the exception and not the rule.198 
If the law we read from trial courts results from risk aversion, perhaps 
opinions appear when judges attempt to vary precedent rather than abide 
by it. In such circumstances, after all, appellate review and reversal is 
probably more likely than the norm. For example, imagine a court decides 
to deny discovery when in comparable circumstances she usually grants it. 
Might she do so through an opinion on the theory that it is the 
extraordinary case that will face appellate scrutiny?199 Qualitative students 
of trial court opinions may read a hundred discovery decisions, never 
realizing that each one runs counter to the larger flowing tide. This 
 
 
 196. There is a process under Federal Appellate Rule 21(b)(4) that makes this brief-writing 
function explicit: “The court of appeals may invite or order the trial-court judge to address the 
[appealing party’s] petition or may invite an amicus curiae to do so. The trial-court judge may request 
permission to address the petition but may not do so unless invited or ordered to do so by the court of 
appeals.” Applications of this rule are rare. See TMichael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, 
Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts 
of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1588 n.291 (2000).T 
 197. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way Judges Think 
and the Way Judges Act, in NORMS AND THE LAW, supra note 121, at 150–51 (suggesting that judges’ 
self-portrait as above politics is flawed). 
 198. Indeed, the results we observed could have been the result of a minority of judges 
systematically writing to avoid appeal, while the majority do not.  
 199. There were 189 discovery orders in the database. Of those orders, plaintiffs (including 
counter-claim defendants) won (in whole or part) 87, a 46% general success rate. Notably, this was 
higher than the overall average win rate of 36%. Of those 87 cases, 10 were written as opinions.  
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suggests that opinions aren’t just briefs. They are briefs in favor of law’s 
black sheep. 
We suggest this ovine analogy with caution because our analysis does 
not tell us whether opinions contain different views of the law than orders. 
Discerning whether the “flock” of orders tracks conventional accounts of 
doctrine will be an important part of the research project that we suggest. 
But even if it turns out that opinions are not significantly unlike orders, 
docketology would be an important advance in the realist project.  
As a method of studying law, docketology focuses us on trial court 
orders, which are the appropriate units when approaching modern 
litigation, which so often results in secret settlements.200 As an account of 
judicial motivation, docketology embraces behavioralism and does not 
insist that judges are perfect utility maximizers. Docketology’s roots are 
old—it has been, after all, more than seventy-five years since Llewellyn 
delivered his Bramble Bush lectures—but it has been practical only within 
the last few years. We invite readers of this Article to try studying dockets. 
You never know what you may find. 
 
 
 200. See generally Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential 
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (2007) (reporting on dataset of 
anonymously coded settlements collected from Federal Magistrates).  
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APPENDIX A: FURTHER NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
The Appendix expands on three topics: (1) the sample; (2) 
categorization of orders; and (3) support for the importance of empirical 
work. 
1. The Jurisdictional Sample 
We analyzed jurisdictions’ case filings for the twelve-month period 
ending March 31, 2003.201 We began the sampling process by converting 
the frequencies of case codes (accessed through the Administrative 
Office’s federal caseload statistics collections) for each jurisdiction into 
percentages.202 We calculated squared percentage differences for each 
jurisdiction by (a) calculating the difference between the State percentage 
and the appropriate National percentage, for each of the twenty-nine types, 
and (b) squaring these differences. Summing these results gives us 
summed squared percentage differences (SSPD). Smaller SSPDs indicate 
greater similarity between the total federal court’s numbers and that 
jurisdiction’s. 
That process resulted in a list ranking jurisdictions from the most to the 
least unremarkable in terms of the kinds of cases they processed.203 We 
removed jurisdictions with incomplete electronic records. This left the 
District of Maryland and Northern District of California, the most 
representative jurisdictions that had complete electronic records. 
We then added the Southern District of New York and the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, respectively the 37th and the 92nd most ordinary 
jurisdictions in terms of the kinds of cases processed (out of 94). These 
jurisdictions, though somewhat unique, are seen as sophisticated and 
important district courts whose practices with respect to opinion filing are 
 
 
 201. See STATISTICS DIV., U.S. COURTS ADMIN. OFFICE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS, 2003 TABLE C-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/tables/ 
C02Mar03.pdf. Other statistics from the Federal Judiciary’s Administrative Office are available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/contents.html. 
 202. See STATISTICS DIV., U.S. COURTS ADMIN. OFFICE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS, 2003, TABLE C-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/tables/ 
C02Mar03.pdf. 
 203. The top ten ordinary jurisdictions, with their sum squared percentage difference scores, were: 
Maryland (1.139), Idaho (1.341), Eastern District of Missouri (1.387), New Hampshire (1.524), 
Kansas (1.808), Northern District of Ohio (1.860), Middle District of Florida (1.909), Colorado 
(1.914), Northern District of California (1.941), and Southern District of Alabama (1.942).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] DOCKETOLOGY, DISTRICT COURTS, AND DOCTRINE 735 
 
 
 
 
significantly ahead of the curve.204 Judges’ opinion-writing practices in 
these jurisdictions are likely to be a model for other regions of the country.  
That said, New York and Pennsylvania are not ordinary. To the extent 
that the jurisdictions are skewed to certain case types and further have 
cultural aspects that promote or retard opinion writing, we confound our 
results. But we are not overly concerned. Pennsylvania’s oddness comes 
almost entirely from the large proportion of asbestos cases filed in that 
year, a case type that was negligibly represented in our sample draw. New 
York’s oddness results from the high percentages of intellectual property 
and financial cases, which also were not large parts of the draw. 
Another issue results from the filing of large numbers of related cases 
in succession, which are then consolidated and transferred through the 
MDL process. We observed one such string of related cases in California 
in the middle of our sample. Such case strings do little to add to the 
variability of the data. In the future, researchers should use a random 
selection method on top of the randomness achieved through the civil 
docket wheel.  
2. Types of Orders 
1 = Scheduling 
2 = Voluntary Dismissal by 
Settlement 
3 = Judgment (Default or 
Otherwise) 
4 = Referral 
5 = Misc. Management (including 
MDL Transfer) 
6 = Remand 
7 = Transfer 
8 = Dismiss 
9 = Judgment on Pleadings 
10 = Class Cert 
11 = Discovery 
12 = SJ 
13 = TRO 
14 = Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) 
15 = Permanent Injunction 
28 = Enforcement of Judgment 
29 = Writ of Attachment 
30 = Intervene  
31 = Attorney’s Fees 
32 = Misc. Dispositive Order 
33 = Leave to Amend 
34 = SJ and Judgment on the Pleading 
35 = Joinder 
36 = PI & Stay 
37 = SJ and Discovery 
38 = PI & Discovery 
41 = Leave to amend and MTD 
43 = Judgment on the Pleadings and Strike 
45 = Subject matter jurisdiction and MTD 
46 = Motion for appeal 
47 = Remand and SJ 
48 = Writ of Execution 
49 = SJ and trial related 
 
 
 204. See, e.g., Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of 
ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 595, 615 (2005). 
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16 = Stay 
17 = Contempt 
18 = R&R Dismiss 
19 = R&R Prisoner 
20 = R&R SJ 
21 = R&R Other 
22 = Order on R&R 
23 = Reconsider 
24 = Appoint Master 
25 = Motion in Limine 
26 = Trial Related 
27 = Post-trial 
 
50 = MTD and SJ 
51 = MTD, fees and discovery 
52 = TRO and Prelim. Inj. 
53 = Remand and Stay 
54 = Forfeiture  
55 = Discovery and fees 
56 = Stay & Transfer to ADR 
57 = Vacate Default Judgment 
58 = Missing 
59 = Arbitration Confirmation 
60 = MTD and Remand 
61 = Pro Se Misc. Dismissal 
Table A-1: Types of orders, based on the underlying motions that prompted 
judicial action. 
 
3. Quantitative Evidence of Quantitative Scholarship 
We created the following table to illustrate the growth of empirical 
scholarship in certain flagship law reviews. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Law Review Q
A 
TA PQ Q
A 
TA PQ Q
A 
TA PQ Q
A 
TA PQ
Yale 0 39 0 0 48 0 0 35 0 4 53 8 
Stanford 4 36 11 5 53 9 3 40 8 12 63 19 
Harvard 4 119 3 2 11
6 
2 4 12
4 
3 8 16
7 
5 
Columbia 2 55 4 0 48 0 2 54 4 6 53 11 
NYU 3 40 8 0 44 0 3 43 7 6 38 16 
Chicago 4 58 7 4 61 7 6 52 12 3 55 5 
Penn 1 37 3 3 61 5 3 38 8 3 34 9 
Berkeley 3 45 7 5 44 11 2 41 5 3 35 9 
Michigan 5 58 9 4 76 5 1 59 2 4 56 7 
Table A-2: TA is the total number of articles for the year in the relevant 
law school’s flagship journal, QA the total number of quantitative 
articles—those that attempted statistical inferences of any kind, and PQ 
the rounded percentage of quantitative articles. Of 2,224 articles 
published in the years reviewed, 131, around 6%, employed quantitative 
statistical research. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] DOCKETOLOGY, DISTRICT COURTS, AND DOCTRINE 737 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: HLM MODELING 
1. Hierarchical Data Structure 
Although hierarchical data structures occur naturally in education, the 
social sciences, business applications, and the physical and natural 
sciences, it is only recently that special software has been written to fit 
suitable models to datasets with hierarchical structure. In this Article, we 
introduce the notion of analyzing a highly structured dataset by way of a 
hierarchical linear model.  
What does it mean for a dataset to have hierarchical structure? 
Basically, the data are arranged naturally into several levels. Individuals 
typically constitute the first level (or Level-1); these individuals are 
grouped into a number of larger entities to form the second level (or 
Level-2); and these grouped individuals will then be grouped together into 
a number of even larger entities to form the third level (or Level-3).  
Such a hierarchical arrangement is exemplified, for example, by 
educational data collected on students, who are grouped into classes, and 
the classes are nested within schools, and so on. For this example, the 
student test scores would be the continuous response variable, the students 
would be described by socioeconomic variables (e.g., parental education, 
parental occupation, income), the classes would be described by teacher 
characteristics (e.g., gender of teacher, teaching experience, teaching 
style), and the schools would be described by type of school (private or 
public), academic level (high, moderate, low), and location (urban, rural, 
suburban). Thus, students in the same class share the same values of all the 
class variables, and classes within the same school share the same values 
of all the school variables.  
2. Hierarchical Linear Models 
In our study, there is much similarity with the student-class-school 
example, but the main difference lies with the response variable. Here, the 
response variable is a Bernoulli variable (rather than a continuous 
variable) with two possible values, 1 (representing “yes”) or 0 
(representing “no”), depending upon whether or not a disposition becomes 
an opinion. This would be akin to converting student scores into pass/fail 
scores only. When the response variable is Bernoulli, it is inappropriate to 
use a normal error model, which is used for continuous responses. The 
most appropriate model for a Bernoulli response variable is a logistic 
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model, where we relate the logit function to the input variables arranged 
by level. 
Each level in the dataset is typically characterized by its own subset of 
the input variables. In our dataset, the following variables, which are 
defined in Appendix C, form the various levels in the hierarchical 
structure: 
Level-1 (Disposition-Specific Factors): DP, OR.MANAG, OR.INTER, 
RCM, JWM, JMNJEXP, and CJRA 
Level-2 (Case-Specific Factors): DIV, AML, ATY, CCI, GOV, K, RP, 
T, CC, CR, PP, LB, TX, SS, BR, IP, SET, APL, and JRY 
Level-3 (Jurisdictional-Specific Factors): EDPA, NDCA, and SDNY 
The Level-1 variables are specific to the dispositions, the Level-2 
variables are specific to the cases, and the Level-3 variables are specific to 
the jurisdictions. 
In hierarchical linear models, each level is described by its own 
submodel, which states the relationship between certain variables. As a 
result, if the data have hierarchical structure, with observations of 
individuals (in our case, dispositions) ordered in time, the classical 
assumption of statistical independence of the observations is violated. 
Also, because the model error variances are no longer homogeneous, we 
cannot assume a constant variance for the observations. Hence, we cannot 
fit a traditional regression model to such data, where we disregard the 
hierarchical structure. 
There is a close relationship between such hierarchical linear models 
and variance components models. Indeed, we can view the model as a one-
way linear model, with the coefficients of the (randomly selected, Level-1) 
disposition-specific variables and the coefficients of the (randomly 
selected, Level-2) case-specific variables as random-effects components, 
and with the coefficients of the (nonrandomly selected, Level-3) 
jurisdictions as fixed-effects components. 
3. Modeling the Dispositions 
Let 1Y =ijk  if the ith disposition nested within the jth case and the kth 
jurisdiction is an opinion, and is 0  otherwise, 
,2,...,1,,2,...,1, kj Jj  Ii ==  .2,...,1, Kk =  We therefore assume that the 
sampling model is Bernoulli with probabilities of “success” and failure 
given by 
,)|1(Prob ijkijk pβY ==  ,1)|0Prob( ijkijk pβY −==  
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respectively, where ijkp  represents the probability of success (i.e., that the 
ith disposition nested within the jth case and the kth jurisdiction is an 
opinion) given β , all the parameters in the model. 
The model that we use in this study is composed of three levels of 
variables that are arranged as separate models as follows. We assume that 
the Level-1 link function is the logit transform, so that the Level-1 model 
which includes all disposition-specific factors, is given by: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− ijk
ijk
e p
p
1
log = 
10, ββ jk + (DP) ijk + 2β (OR.MANAG) ijk  
                  3β+ (OR.INTER) ijk + 4β (RCM) ijk + 5β (JWM) ijk  
                  6β+ (JMN) ijk + 7β (JEXP) ijk + 8β (CJRA) ijk + ,ijku  
where 0β  is the intercept term, lβ  is the coefficient of the l th Level-1 
variable, 2,...,8,1,=l  and ijku  is the associated error term. The logit 
transform, ))/(( p1ploge − , of p  is the logarithm of the odds of success, 
defined as the ratio of the probability of success to the probability of 
failure. The Level-1 model relates the logit transform of p  to a linear 
function of the input variables plus an error term. 
The Level-2 model, which includes all case-specific factors, is given 
by: 
=jkβ0, 0100, ββ k + (DIV) jk + 02β (AML) jk + 03β (ATY) jk  + 
                     04β  (CCI) jk 05β+ (GOV) jk + 06β (K) jk + 07β (RP) jk + 
                     08β  (T) jk  0,9β  (CC) jk 0,10β+ (CR) jk + 0,11β (PP jk + 
                    0,12β (LB) jk + 0,13β (TX) jk + 0,14β (SS) jk + 0,15β (BR) jk + 
                   0,16β (IP) jk + 0,17β (SET) jk + 0,18β (APL) jk + 
                   0,19β (JRY) jk + jku0, , 
where 00β  is the intercept term in the Level-2 model for ,0β mβ0  is the 
coefficient of the mth Level-2 variable, ,1,2,...,19=m  and 0u  represents 
the Bernoulli error term of the Level-2 model. 
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The Level-3 model, which includes all jurisdictional-specific factors, is 
given by: 
k,00β = 
 001000 ββ + (EDPA) k + 002β (NDCA) k + 003β (SDNY) k + ,u k,00  
where 000β B Bis the intercept term in the Level-3 model for 0,β mβ0  is the 
coefficient of the kth jurisdiction in the Level-3 model 3,2,1=k , and 00u  
is the Bernoulli error term of the Level-3 model. Note that we expressed 
the three jurisdictions in the model, EDPA, NDCA, and SDNY, as 
indicator (or dummy) variables: (EDPA) 1=k  if 1=k  and is 0  
otherwise, (NDCA) 1=k  if 2=k  and is 0  otherwise, and (SDNY) 1=k  
if 3=k  and is 0  otherwise. 
At every level of this three-level model, we have used the standard 
analysis of variance convention of setting one level of each factor to zero. 
Thus, for example, MD does not appear in the Level-3 portion of the 
model. The omitted level of a given factor, thus, acts as a baseline level of 
zero from which the other levels of that particular factor may be 
compared. 
4. Estimating Probabilities  
It will be convenient to write the intercept 000β  as μ , and to collect 
all the regression coefficients 
),...,,...,,...,( 003002,20,001,81 ββββββ  
into the vector β B Band all the variables (DP,..., CJRA, DIV,..., JRY, 
EDPA,..., SDNY) into the vector X . The above 3-level model can be then 
written as 
,Ζ eμ τ ++= Χβ  
where ))/(1((log))/(1(logΖ ijkijkee pppp −=−=  is a vector with n  =  
∑ =Kk 1 ∑=kJ j 1 jI  entries, and 000 uuue ++=  is a random error term, 
and τβ  is the transpose of the vector β . 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] DOCKETOLOGY, DISTRICT COURTS, AND DOCTRINE 741 
 
 
 
 
HLM processing of the model yields a vector of parameter estimates  
that can be written as the vector βˆ . From the output, the estimated log-
odds ratio,  
Χβ τe μp
p
logΖ ˆˆ
ˆ1
ˆˆ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= , 
is computed, where μˆ  is the estimated intercept and Χ  is the vector of 
variables. The log-odds ratio can be inverted to give an estimated 
probability: 
=pˆ
z
z
e
e
ˆ
ˆ
1+
, 
where 
,ˆˆˆ Χ
τβμz eee =  
Because all variables are 0-1 indicator variables, setting all variables to 
their zero-values yields the estimated baseline probability: 
=0pˆ μ
μ
ˆ
ˆ
1 e
e
+
, 
If we now set ,1=vX  while leaving all other variables as zeros, we have 
that 
=vpˆ  
v
v
ee
ee
βμ
βμ
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
1+
, 
where βˆ v is the estimated coefficient of vX . In other words, the effect of 
setting 1=vX  (while keeping the values of all other variables fixed at 
zero) is to increase the odds of a positive response multiplicatively by the 
factor exp ( βˆ v). 
For example, consider the effect of a disposition originating from the 
EDPA jurisdiction. From fitting the full model, the intercept estimate is 
915.2ˆ −=μ  and the coefficient estimate for EDPA is 712.1ˆ001 =β . 
Taking exponentials of both, we have, to four decimal places, that 
0542.0915.2ˆ == −eeμ , .5400.5712.1001ˆ == eeβ  
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So, holding all else constant, a disposition originating from the EDPA 
jurisdiction has odds of an opinion being written that is 5.54 times higher 
than the odds of an opinion being written from a disposition from the MD 
jurisdiction (because MD is the baseline jurisdiction). We next multiply 
these two terms together to get 
.002938.0...)5400.5...)(0542.0(ˆˆ ==001βμee  
Thus, 
pˆEDPA= B
001
001
βμ
βμ
ee
ee
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
1 +
=
002938.1
002938.0 002929.0= , 
Or just over 0.29%. 
Table B-1 gives the calculations of estimated probabilities for all 
factors in the full HLM. 
TABLE B-1: COMPUTATION OF THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF 
EACH FACTOR IN THE F HLM 
Factor (v) βˆ v exp( βˆ v) exp( μ )∗  
exp( βˆ v) 
vpˆ ∗ 100% 
Intercept (μ) -2.915   0.0542 0.002938   0.2929 
EDPA  1.712   5.5400 0.300292 23.0942 
NDCA  0.470   1.6000 0.086726   7.9805 
SDNY  2.127   8.3897 0.454753 31.2598 
DIV  0.532   1.7023 0.092273   8.4478 
AML -0.120   0.8869 0.048075   4.5870 
ATY  0.008   1.0080 0.054639   5.1809 
CCI -0.660   0.5169 0.028015   2.7252 
GOV  0.070   1.0725 0.058134   5.4940 
K  0.707   2.0279 0.109920   9.9034 
RP  0.811   2.2502 0.121968 10.8709 
T -1.280   0.2780 0.015071   1.4847 
CC  1.157   3.1804 0.172389 14.7041 
CR -0.220   0.8025 0.043500   4.1686 
PP -1.224   0.2941 0.015939   1.5689 
CB  1.356   3.8806 0.210346 17.3790 
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Factor (v) βˆ v exp( βˆ v) exp( μ )∗  
exp( βˆ v) 
vpˆ ∗ 100% 
TX  2.624 13.7908 0.747516 42.7759 
SS -0.011   0.9891 0.053611   5.0883 
BR  1.505   4.5042 0.244143 19.6234 
IP  0.823   2.2773 0.123440 10.9877 
SET -0.262   0.7695 0.041711   4.0040 
APL  0.888   2.4303 0.131730 11.6397 
JRY  0.127   1.1354 0.061544   5.7976 
DP  0.000   1.0000 0.054204   5.1417 
OR.MANAG -1.282   0.2775 0.015041   1.4818 
OR.INTER -0.800   0.4493 0.024355   2.3776 
RCM -0.028   0.9724 0.052707   5.0068 
JWN  0.270   1.3100 0.071005   6.6298 
JMN -0.176   0.8386 0.045456   4.3480 
JEXP  0.006   1.0060 0.054530   5.1710 
CJRA -0.008   0.9920 0.053772   5.1028 
 
5. Reducing the Size of the Model 
Just as there are many different reasons why one would want to reduce 
the number of variables in a regression model, there are also many 
different ways of doing it. In this discussion, we focus on a stepwise 
method that is most appropriate when dealing with a hierarchical model. 
Variable reduction (also called subset selection) is a statistical 
procedure that is commonly used when one is faced with the problem of 
fitting a regression model having a large number of variables. In general, 
we wish to reduce a large model (which may contain a variety of types of 
variables) to a much smaller one, where the “smaller” model contains the 
most important subset of those variables that best explain the dependent 
variable. This is the desirable principle of deriving a parsimonious model. 
Small models having few variables are usually much more understandable 
than larger models having many variables. Variables that are dropped from 
an initial model in order to create a reduced model are considered to have 
no significant contribution in explaining the behavior of the dependant 
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variable. Such nonsignificant variables are considered as noise, and are 
added to the error component of the model to form a new error component.  
Each variable in a regression model can be considered to have two 
possible states: the variable can be in the equation or out of it. So, if we 
have p  possible predictor variables for an analysis, then there are 12 −p  
possible regression models (we do not include the empty model with no 
variables). If p  is large, computing all those regression models and 
evaluating their goodness of fit will be a daunting job. Stepwise methods 
were introduced as automated techniques for finding a path through the 
different possible models in the most efficient way. Such a path looks at 
differently-sized nested subsets of variables and assesses whether or not to 
add one variable to the subset or drop one variable from the subset.  
The stepwise method we use in this paper is that of “backwards 
elimination” (BE). When using the BE stepwise method, we start out with 
the full model, and at each step we remove one variable from the current 
model. The variable that is removed from the model at each step is that 
variable with the smallest | t |- value (or the largest p -value) of all the 
variables currently in the model. As of this writing, there is no software to 
carry out an automated BE stepwise method for an HLM; as a result, we 
manually carried out a BE stepwise procedure for our three-level HLM, 
stopping when all the variables remaining in the model had a | t |- value 
greater than 2.0.  
In our stepwise analysis of the above HLM, we arrive at a reduced 
HLM having the following subset of the variables at Level- 1:  
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− ijk
ijk
e p
p
1
log  
1,0 ββ +ijk (OR.MANAG) 2β+ijk (OR.INTER) ijkijk u+ , 
where the Level-2 portion of the model is: 
01,00,0 βββ += jkijk (T) 02β+jk (K) 03β+jk (PP) jk  
04β+ (LB) jk + 05β (APL) ijkjk u ;0+ , 
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TABLE B-2: COMPUTATION OF THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF 
EACH FACTOR IN THE REDUCED HLM FOR THE SDNY JURISDICTION.  
Here 1239.0)088.2exp()ˆexp( =−=μ  AND 
.8603.5)768.1exp()ˆexp( ==SDNYβ  
Factor )(v   βˆ v  exp ( βˆ v) 
exp exp)ˆ( ∗μ ( βˆ SDNY)* 
exp ( βˆ v) 
pˆv* 
100% 
K  0.814 2.2572 1.63838 62.0980 
T -1.004 0.3664 0.26593 21.0065 
PP -1.546 0.2132 0.15471 13.3983 
LB  1.016 2.7611 2.00410 66.7121 
APL  0.927 2.5269 1.83414 64.7160 
OR.MANAG -1.174 0.3092 0.22442 18.3287 
OR.INTER -0.817 0.4416 0.03205 24.2710 
 
and the Level-3 portion of the model is: 
jk,00β  = 001,000 ββ +k (EDPA) 002β+k (SDNY) jkk u ,00+ , 
where jkijkijk uuu ,00,,0,  are the independent Bernoulli error components of 
the model. 
The calculations for estimating the probabilities for all factors in the 
reduced HLM are given in Tables B-2 (for the SDNY jurisdiction), Table 
B-3 (for the EDPA jurisdiction), and Table B-4 (for the baseline NDCA 
and MD jurisdictions). For the SDNY jurisdiction, the computation uses a 
product of three terms: 
 exp)ˆexp(μ ( βˆ SDNY) exp ( βˆ v),  
where v is the particular factor being considered. For the EDPA 
jurisdiction, we multiply the three terms,  
exp)ˆexp(μ ( βˆ EDPA) exp ( βˆ v).  
For the baseline NDCA and MD jurisdictions, the coefficient is zero, the 
jurisdiction multiplier is unity, and the computation only uses a product of 
two terms,  
).ˆexp()ˆexp( vβμ  
There are other subset selection methods for use in multiple regression 
problems that are favored over stepwise methods. However, as of this 
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writing, such methods are not yet available for HLMs, which have more 
complex structures than plain-vanilla multiple regression models.  
TABLE B-3: COMPUTATION OF THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF 
EACH FACTOR IN THE REDUCED HLM FOR THE EDPA JURISDICTION.  
Here,  1230.0)088.2(exp)ˆ(exp =−=μ  AND 
9028.3)362.1(exp)ˆ(exp ==EDPAβ . 
Factor )(v   βˆ v  )ˆ(exp vβ   )ˆ(exp
) ˆ(exp)μˆ(exp EDPA
vβ
β
∗
∗
vpˆ ∗ 100%
K  0.814 2.2572 1.63838 52.1790 
T -1.004 0.3664 0.17710 15.0456 
PP -1.546 0.2132 0.10304 9.3411 
LB  1.016 2.7611 1.33469 57.1677 
APL  0.927 2.5269 1.22150 54.9854 
OR.MANAG -1.174 0.3092 0.14946 13.0026 
OR.INTER -0.817 0.4416 0.21345 17.5900 
 
TABLE B-4: COMPUTATION OF THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF 
EACH FACTOR IN THE REDUCED HLM FOR THE NDCA AND MD 
JURISDICTIONS.  Here, 
5.8603).exp(.768))ˆexp(and0.12392.088)exp()ˆexp( SDNY ===−= βμ  
Factor (v)  vβˆ  )ˆexp( vβ   )ˆ( exp)ˆ exp( vβμ ∗  vpˆ ∗ 100%
K  0.814 2.2572 1.27958 21.8491 
T -1.004 0.3664 1.04538   4.3408 
PP -1.546 0.2132 1.02640   2.5721 
LB  1.016 2.7611 1.34198 25.4833 
APL  0.927 2.5269 1.31298 23.8374 
OR.MANAG -1.174 0.3092 1.03830   3.6883 
OR.INTER -0.817 0.4416 1.05469   5.1854 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, CODING, AND HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING 
1. Jurisdictional Factors 
We first created an index of judicial culture. Defining district court 
culture is not easy. We focused on the 2002–2003 year. We decided to 
focus on total opinions in the entire jurisdiction (collected on Westlaw) by 
total judges (as listed in the CJRA).  
 EDPA SDNY DMD NDCA 
Total Opinions 1370 3081 688 285 
Total Judges 50 62 40 34 
CLT Factor 27.4 49.7 17.2 8.4 
 
 
We hypothesize that courts with a higher number of opinions per judge 
would be more likely to produce an opinion in a given disposition. 
2. Case Factors 
DIV: Was jurisdiction founded on diversity of citizenship? 
We hypothesize that diverse cases are less likely to result in opinions. 
This is a straightforward application of the importance hypothesis: 
scholars and judges have often asserted that diversity cases are a nuisance 
for federal judiciary.205 
AML: Was an AMLAW 100 firm involved in the case? 
We measured AMLAW by asking if any counsel listed on the docket 
was a member of the 2003 list of AMLAW 100 firms.206 We identified 97 
cases with AMLAW firms. In such cases, as an application of our 
demographic hypothesis, we predict that the tendency to write opinions 
would increase. Judges writing for powerful audiences ought to be more 
likely to try to curry favor by spending more time on the case. 
 
 
 205. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 317, 322 (1977) (relaying negative judicial views on diversity cases). 
 206. Jim Schroeder, Michael Ravnitzky & Sara Yoon, T he AM Law 100, 2003: The Charts, AM. 
LAW.,T July 2003, at 109 (39). 
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ATY: How many law firms were on the docket? 
This is a straightforward count of the number of law firms or individual 
lawyers involved in a case, through a reading of the docket. Thus, pro se 
counted as 0 for this variable. Our largest number of observed firms in one 
case was 14. Like AML, we hypothesize that more firms would be 
correlated with higher propensities to write opinions. 
CCI: Case Complication Index 
CCI is an index created by running a principal components analysis 
(PCA) on Duration of Case, an indicator variable for duration of case 
(identifying whether a case was completed or not),207 and total docket 
entries. The PCA was computed using a correlation matrix (not a 
covariance matrix). CCI is the first principal component score. Negative 
values for CCI correlate with more complicated cases—those with higher 
durations and docket entries. We predicted that opinions would be more 
likely in such cases, as a result of our importance hypothesis. However, 
this was the matter of some debate. The importance hypothesis here runs 
in tension with the settlement hypothesis: more complicated cases may be 
the ones that judges least want to aggravate with opinion writing.  
GOV: Was the federal government a party to the case? 
This variable identifies whether the federal government is a party, 
either as a plaintiff, defendant, or in any other form. We identified only 20 
federal party cases in the set of difficult cases. We hypothesize that the 
federal government is involved most often in cases that are high-profile, 
and as an implication of our importance hypothesis, we would predict a 
positive association with opinion writing. 
IMP: How important was the case? 
To measure importance based on case type, we first recoded the case 
types provided by the Federal Judiciary as follows.208  
• IF 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 151, 152, 153, 190, 195, 196 THEN 
RECODE as CONTRACTS 
• IF 210, 220, 230, 290 THEN RECORD as REAL PROPERTY 
• IF 240, 245, 310, 315, 320, 330, 340, 345, 350, 355, 360, 362, 
365, 368, 370, 371, 380, 385 THEN RECODE as TORTS 
(PRIVATE) 
• IF 160, 410, 430, 450, 470, 480, 490, 850, 875, 891, 892, 893, 894 
THEN RECODE as CIVIL COMMERCIAL 
 
 
 207. This variable is activated in cases where the docket was not yet terminated on the date that 
the data was collected, i.e., the case was still pending. 
 208. See PACER SERVICE CENTER, NATURE OF SUIT CODES, available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts. 
gov/documents/natsuit.pdf for a list of case types. 
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• IF 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446 THEN RECODE as CIVIL 
RIGHTS 
• IF 510, 530, 535, 540, 550, 555 THEN RECODE as 
PRISONER’S PETITITONS 
• IF 710, 720, 730, 740, 790, 791 THEN RECODE as LABOR 
• If 422, 423 THEN RECODE as BANKRUPTCY 
• If 820, 830, 840 THEN RECODE as INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
• If 861, 862, 863, 864, 865 THEN RECODE as SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
• If 870, 871 THEN RECODE as TAX 
• IF ANYTHING ELSE THEN RECODE as OTHER FEDERAL 
ACTIONS 
These categories better tracked relationships between cases than the 
nature of suit codes permitted. We hypothesized, based on prior work, that 
courts would see intellectual property, civil rights, civil commercial, and 
contracts as more important than the norm. We hypothesized that courts 
would see prisoner petitions, social security, labor, tax, and real property 
as less important than the norm. The “other federal actions” category was 
therefore the baseline and removed from the HLM analysis. 
SET: Did the case end in a settlement? 
We coded SET in the affirmative where the terminal docket entry was 
an agreed settlement by the parties. As noted in the text, approximately 
20% of cases involving hard orders settled. Approximately 35% ended in a 
judgment on the merits. (The remainder were transferred, remanded, 
abandoned, or were still pending.) We hypothesized that cases that settled 
would be less likely to result in orders, a product of our settlement 
hypothesis. 
APL: Did the case end in an appeal? 
Approximately 14% of cases were appealed. As a product of our 
reversal hypothesis, we predicted that such cases would be more likely to 
contain opinions, as the judges estimated the likelihood of an appeal and 
reacted accordingly. Notably, since appeal notices usually divest trial 
courts of jurisdiction, judges’ opinion writing in such cases is based on a 
mere prediction about the likelihood of appeal. 
JRY: Did any party demand a jury? 
As a product of our settlement hypothesis, we assume that judges 
would be less likely to write opinions in cases where the parties had 
demanded a jury. The basic intuition is that in non-jury cases, courts will 
be more likely to write opinions as a matter of course; in jury cases, by 
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contrast, the ultimate decision will be a jury’s and the court can only 
endow the parties with settlement-deterring rights if it makes its opinions 
clear.  
3. Dispositional Factors209 
DP: How many days was the case pending when the disposition 
issued? 
This variable measures the difference between the filed date of the case 
and the date of the order, in days. As a product of the settlement 
hypothesis, we predict that earlier in cases, judges will be less willing to 
write opinions, on the theory that such endowments reduce the likelihood 
of settlement. Additionally, the reversal hypothesis predicts that late in 
cases, judges would fairly anticipate that appeal is more likely from any 
given disposition. 
ORD: What was the order type? 
See supra text accompanying notes 147 through 150. 
RCM: Who won the disposition? 
Each disposition was coded as one of ten possibilities: (1) defendant 
wins (40.6% of dispositions); (2) defendant wins in part (6.9%); (3) 
neither side wins (15.2%); (4) plaintiff wins in part (5.3%); (5) plaintiff 
wins (29.2%); (6) plaintiff wins in part and defendant wins in part (1.3%); 
(7) counterclaim defendant wins (0.7%); (8) counterclaim defendant wins 
in part (0.3%); (9) counterclaim plaintiff wins (0.1%); and (10) 
counterclaim plaintiff wins in part (no observations). We recoded this into 
two possibilities, composed of a compromise decision (numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 
8, 10, consisting together of 29% of dispositions) and a pure victory for 
one side of the other (1, 5, 7, 9, consisting of the remainder of 
dispositions). The settlement hypothesis predicts that compromise verdicts 
should be more likely to be associated with opinion writing. Verdicts 
where one party clearly wins will, by contrast, by written as orders so the 
 
 
 209. We note an important missing variable. Law clerks write the first drafts of many opinions in 
both the trial and appellate courts. See Orran L. Brown, Tribute, Tribute to Judge Merhige, T40 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 15, 17 T (2005) (“[Trial judge] relied on his clerks to write drafts of orders and 
opinions.”). Some have argued that clerks’ role in drafting opinions has increased significantly with 
the number of opinions arising from the district courts. Levin H. Campbell, Tribute, A Tribute to Judge 
Bailey Aldrich, TBOSTON BAR J., Apr. 1994, at 10, 11T (“There aren’t many judges today who write their 
opinions from scratch; rather, while modern judges remain closely involved and do the deciding, most 
utilize law clerks actively in the drafting.”). If it were possible, a full analysis would try to account for 
changing clerks, and might even find a way to model the effects of assiduous versus lazy clerks on the 
propensity to write. Our analysis is more preliminary. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/1
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parties are not endowed with overconfidence and consequently fail to 
settle. 
JWM: Was the writing judge a woman? 
Because judges can change during the life of a case, we coded the 
judicial characteristics on a disposition-by-disposition basis. We identified 
the gender of judges by looking at the almanac of the federal judiciary, 
combined with observation of court web pages. 25% of the total hard 
dispositions were written by women. The demographic hypothesis predicts 
that women judges may have to work harder (and write more opinions) to 
achieve the same reputation effects. Therefore, women judges ought to be 
associated with more opinion writing. 
JMN: Was the writing judge a minority? 
We identified minority judges through the Almanac of Federal 
Judiciary and court web pages. For our purposes, minorities included 
African-Americans, Latinos (where so identified), Native Americans, and 
Asian-Americans. 22% of the total hard dispositions were written by 
minorities, so defined. The JMN hypothesis follows the JWM hypothesis 
in direction. 
JEXP: How experienced was the writing judge? 
We measured judicial experience as of the date of the order (i.e., it may 
change during a case). It is a function of total years judging, including 
years as a state court judge if applicable, as measured by biographies 
collected in the Almanac of Federal Judiciary. The mean judicial 
experience in the hard order database was 8.65 years, the maximum, 44 
years. We predicted that more experienced judges ought to be less likely to 
write opinions. 
CJRA: How many orders did the writing judge have on the closest 
Civil Justice Reform Act statistics? 
We measured this factor by identifying the CJRA reports through 
Westlaw, taking the number of orders on the delay list on the date closest 
to the order, i.e., if the order was issued in February 2004, we took the 
March 2004 CJRA statistics. The demographic hypothesis predicts that 
judges seeking to maximize their reputations will write less as their delay 
statistics increase. 
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